## Grapevine – 1NC – Rd. 1

### 1

Turn – Castro Cred

A. Economic reforms are coming now in Cuba – causes long term stability-----GREEN

Sweig and Rockefeller, 2013 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, and Michael Bustamante “Cuba After Communism The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming the Island” <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991>)

Small-time diaspora capital may prove easier to regulate and rely on than funds from multinational corporations driven strictly by profits. Under the repatriation provisions of the island's new migration law, some Cubans may even retire to the island with their pensions and savings after decades of working abroad. Yet opening the doors for more young citizens to leave could prove risky for a quickly aging, low-birthrate society that has been suffering from a brain drain for some time. Besides, along with remittance dollars, Cuba urgently needs both medium and large investors. Ultimately, only larger outlays can help fix Cuba's most fundamental economic problem: its depleted productive base. Castro appears to recognize that attracting foreign investment, decentralizing the government, and further expanding the private sector are the only ways to tackle this long-term predicament. The government is unlikely to proceed with anything but caution, however. Officials are wary of rocking the domestic political boat, and citizens and party leaders alike recoil from the prospect of more radical shock therapy. Rising public protests in China and Vietnam against inequality and rampant corruption have only reinforced the Cuban government's preference for gradualism. Striking an adequate balance will be no easy task. In late 2012, Havana legalized the creation of transportation cooperatives -- private, profit-sharing entities owned and manage by their members -- to fix bottlenecks in agricultural distribution. Meanwhile, 100 state enterprises are now running their finances completely autonomously as part of a yearlong pilot program. The government is also reportedly considering ways to offer a wider array of potential foreign partners more advantageous terms for joint ventures. But the Communist Party is working through numerous contradictions -- recognizing a place for market economics, challenging old biases against entrepreneurs, and hinting at decentralizing the budget while incongruously insisting, in the words of its official 2011 guidelines, that "central planning, and not the market, will take precedence."¶ EASING OFF THE DADDY STATE¶ Curtailing the state's economic role while preserving political continuity requires threading a delicate ideological needle. Although the government expects to continue providing Cubans with key social services, such as health care and education, party leaders have reprimanded the island's citizens for otherwise depending too heavily on what one prominent official a few years ago called the "daddy state." In the eyes of many Cubans, this is deeply ironic. Cuba's revolutionary founders, who built up a paternalistic state in the service of equality, are now calling for that state's partial dismantlement. What's more, most Cubans already need to resort to the black market or assistance from family abroad to acquire many daily necessities.

B. The plan creates a political whirlwind that kills reforms and causes instability-----GREEN

Hernandez, 2012 (Cuba’s Leading Social Sciences professor and researcher at the University of Havana and the High Institute of International Relations; Director of U.S. studies at the Centro de Estudios sobre America; and a Senior Research Fellow at the Instituto cubano de Investigacion Cultural “Juan Marinello” in Havana. “Debating U.S-Cuban Relations”)

As far as costs are concerned, although many Cubans favor detente and appreciate its economic benefits, they also remain worried about its political and ideological effects. These could affect the national consensus in a period during which social and political cohesion is of strategic value. A wave of U.S. capital flooding a Cuban economy that has not completed its reform process could have some counter­productive effects. The U.S. government could try to steer the flow of capital to favor its political goals. Various groups— Cuban-American organizations, NGOs, other institutions, and the U.S. ideological apparatuses—would have more avenues to influence the Cuban domestic context.¶ Given the fundamental asymmetry of power between the two sides, once the words "let's play cards" are spoken, the "hands" will be quite unequal. If the United States were to reverse its policy and begin to "make concessions" in return for "equivalent Cuban responses," the government of the Island would find itself in an unprecedented tactical arid strategic situation. This won't be one more round but, rather, a whole new rule book. In other words, with any increased chance of an alternative form of relations, the risk profile of quid pro quo increases. For Cuba, to take on this challenge could mean to adopt a conservative line and play defensively only; or it could mean to invent a new proactive strategy for the game. Within such a new approach, the ability to realign the available resources of political power would be decisive. Classically, the sources of political power in a situation of asymmetric confrontation lie in alliances and in consensus. This issue is complex both for Cuba and for the United States. Besides allied powers, affinities within the international system, and sympathetic ideological currents, the dynamic of rapprochement not only highlights and energizes the role of "rivals" or "opponents" but also that of" allies" within the "enemy's" own camp. The identities of such allies of the United States in the region, in Europe, and also on the Island are obvious. The allies of Cuba are also well known, paradoxically including novel ones such as many business executives and military officials who had classically been the "tips of the imperialist spear."¶ In a scenario of re-encounter between the United States and Cuba, both governments face the challenge of overcoming old dogmas, dealing with changes in the respective political consensus of each, trying to reshape those and restructure their alliances. The main weakness Cuba must overcome is not its lesser military or physical power but its siege mentality. That of the United States is not its ineptitude in dealing effectively with "communist regimes" but its sense of superpower omnipotence.

Cuban instability causes Caribbean instability, democratic backsliding, and nuclear war with Korea, Iran, and China

Gorrell, 2005 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

**Miscalc ensures escalation**

**Colby et al 13**., March 2013, “Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations: A way forward,” A report of the Poni Working Group on U.S.-China Nuclear Dynamics, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Elbridge Colby- consultant to the Global Security Directorate and the U.S. Strategic Command and the National Intelligence Council, principal analyst for Global Strategic Affairs in Center for Naval Analyses, BA in History from Harvard College and J.D. from Yale Law School; Abraham M. Denmark- fellow with the Center for a New American Security and directed the Asia-Pacific Security Program, former Country Director for China Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, History and Political Science at the University of Northern Colorado, MA in International Security from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver; Directed by John K. Warden- intern at CSIS; [http://csis.org/file...uclear\_Web.pdf,](http://csis.org/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf,) KTG

Considerations of U.S.-China nuclear relations would be a largely academic exercise without the serious risk of conflict and tension those relations entail. Unfortunately, the significant sources of tension and disagreement between the United States and China could, in the worst case, lead to conflict because a number of these disputes center on highly valued interests for Washington and Beijing and could be exacerbated by third parties, by miscommunication and miscalculation, by domestic political pressures, and by the perceived need to “save face.”10 Moreover, few of these dis- putes appear likely to be resolved definitively in the near term. Beyond disputes, there is also the simple geopolitical reality of the rise of a new great power in the arena of a well-established status quo power. From time immemorial,this reality has proved to be a source of tension and competi- tion among nations—and has often led to war.¶ A large-scale conventional war between the United States and China would be incredibly dangerous and destructive, and nuclear war between the two countries would be devastating for all involved. Even though the likelihood of conventional war between the two nations is currently low—and the probability of nuclear war is even lower—the appallingly high costs, dangers, and risks of a war demand that this risk be taken seriously and that steps be taken to render armed conflict more unlikely and less dangerous. The fact that China and the United States could come to blows does not mean that any conflict would result in the use of nuclear weapons, but it also does not mean that the use of nuclear weapons can be confidently ruled out, especially because even conflicts over apparently marginal issues can—in ways that are not entirely predictable in advance—escalate into conflicts over core interests. For these reasons, perhaps the single most im- portant task of American statecraft in the coming century will be managing China’s rise in a way that preserves peace while also defending important U.S. interests.11¶ The following factors could threaten those objectives.¶ Disputes¶ Taiwan. Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the United States and China. Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, and the United States maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s de- fense.12 Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated¶ by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements.13 Moreover, for the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of U.S. defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.

### 2

#### Aff causes broader relations

Shifter 12

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Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America. The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive instrument. It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations. Although the United States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba. Cuba is one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American engagement. At the same time, Cuba’s authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the Americas. At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully controls the press. Latin American and Caribbean nations could be instrumental in supporting Cuba’s eventual transition to democratic rule. An end to the US policy of isolating Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights violations, would be an important first step. Many of the issues on the hemispheric agenda carry critical global dimensions. Because of this, the United States should seek greater cooperation and consultation with Brazil, Mexico, and other countries of the region in world forums addressing shared interests. Brazil has the broadest international presence and influence of any Latin American nation. In recent years it has become far more active on global issues of concern to the United States. The United States and Brazil have clashed over such issues as Iran’s nuclear program, non-proliferation, and the Middle East uprisings, but they have cooperated when their interests converged, such as in the World Trade Organization and the G-20 (Mexico, Argentina, and Canada also participate in the G-20), and in efforts to rebuild and provide security for Haiti. Washington has worked with Brazil and other Latin American countries to raise the profile of emerging economies in various international financial agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and other Latin American nations are assuming enhanced roles on an array of global political, environmental, and security issues. Several for which US and Latin American cooperation could become increasingly important include: As the world’s lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the opportunity to participate more actively in non-proliferation efforts. Although US and Latin American interests do not always converge on non-proliferation questions, they align on some related goals. For example, the main proliferation challenges today are found in developing and unstable parts of the world, as well as in the leakage—or transfer of nuclear materials—to terrorists. In that context, south-south connections are crucial. Brazil could play a pivotal role. Many countries in the region give priority to climate change challenges. This may position them as a voice in international debates on this topic. The importance of the Amazon basin to worldwide climate concerns gives Brazil and five other South American nations a special role to play. Mexico already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20. Mexico hosted the second international meeting on climate change in Cancún in 2010. The United States is handicapped by its inability to devise a climate change policy. Still, it should support coordination on the presumption of shared interests on a critical policy challenge. Latin Americans are taking more active leadership on drug policy in the hemisphere and could become increasingly influential in global discussions of drug strategies. Although the United States and Latin America are often at odds on drug policy, they have mutual interests and goals that should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more effective approach to the problem.

#### Increase in US influence in Latin America directly trades off with Chinese influence

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### Chinese influence is key to Chinese growth

Armony 12(Ariel Armony is Weeks Professor in Latin American Studies, Professor of International Studies and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at the University of Miami. Spring 2012 “What Is China to Latin America”, http://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/hemisphere\_vol\_21.pdf nkj) Note—Please excuse the capitalization issues—the article wouldn’t copy right

What is China to Latin America? Among other things, China represents a market, a partner and a competitor. China’s need for primary commodities to feed its manufacturing growth and unprecedented urbanization entails a vast demand for everything from soybeans to copper as well as higher prices for such commodities in the international market. Latin American exports to China have skyrocketed in response to this demand in the last decade. High commodity prices and ample revenues are helping to sustain economic growth and strengthen fiscal accounts in several countries. As mentioned above, however, Chinese demand mainly benefits commodity producers in South American countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru. The smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean cannot benefit from trade with China unless they find a niche market (such as Costa Rican coffee). The reliance on primary commodities also entails the risk of resource dependency for exporting nations. This pattern of trade has clear limitations for long-term development. Among other limitations, it is not a big job creator and it does not contribute by itself (that is, without state intervention) to alleviate poverty and inequality. In brief, China is a market for Latin America, and one with great potential, but a shift from “fairy tale” to realism will have to occur if the region wants sustained benefits in the long run. Is China a partner for Latin America? China has the potential to collaborate with Latin American countries in a number of ways: in the realms of technology, infrastructure, poverty reduction and educational programs; as a source of foreign investment and aid; and as an ally on the diplomatic front. as Juan Gabriel tokatlian has argued, for example, China’s model of international diplomacy entails some attractive notions for Latin America: multilateral politics, noninterference in domestic affairs, sovereign integrity, horizontal collaboration between “equals” and pragmatism. a concrete potential for partnership exists in this realm. China conceives of its national security as a three-pronged approach: “national sovereignty” (territorial integrity and national reunification), “comprehensive security” (preservation of its political and economic system and cultural heritage), and “security in the global system” (terms of insertion in the international system). to guarantee terms of insertion that could satisfy the Chinese leadership’s demand for “equality, fairness, and justice,”

#### That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 **–** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### 3

#### Obama has the upper hand on debt limit now but GOP demands could create a complicated battle

Kapur, 9/9 --- TPM’s senior congressional reporter and Supreme Court correspondent

(9/9/2013, Sahil, “Is House GOP Backing Down In Debt Limit Fight?” <http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/09/house-gop-cantor-memo-debt-ceiling-cr-sequester-immigration.php>)

House Republicans are taming members’ expectations ahead of the debt limit showdown, signaling that they may not be able to extract significant concessions from Democrats.

A Friday memo to GOP members by Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) says “the House will act to prevent a default on our obligations before” the mid-October deadline the Obama administration has established. “House Republicans,” he says, “will demand fiscal reforms and pro-growth policies which put us on a path to balance in ten years in exchange for another increase in the debt limit.”

The language is vague — intentionally so, in order to maintain wiggle room for Republicans to avert a disastrous debt default. President Barack Obama has vowed not to pay a ransom to ensure the U.S. can meet its obligations.

If and when they do cave, Republicans will be hard-pressed to show their base they got something in return for raising the debt ceiling. In January, they got Senate Democrats to agree to pass a non-binding budget resolution. This time around, the possibilities for symbolic concessions range from a doomed Senate vote to delay or defund Obamacare or instructions to initiate the process of tax reform.

There are a number of demands rank-and-file Republicans have urged leaders to make which could genuinely complicate the battle, such as dollar-for-dollar spending cuts or unwinding Obamacare. Cantor’s memo mentioned neither. GOP members have also called on leadership not to bring up any debt limit bill that lacks the support of half the conference. Boehner hasn’t committed to this and Cantor didn’t mention it in his memo.

There are several reasons Republicans will have a hard time extracting concessions. Back in January, when Obama held firm and refused to negotiate on the debt limit, Republicans folded and agreed to suspend the debt ceiling without substantial concessions but rather symbolic ones. And due to deep divisions within the conference, House Republicans will face enormous challenges in rounding up 218 votes to pass any conceivable debt limit hike.

The party’s top priority is to cut safety-net programs like Social Security and Medicare. But there’s no internal consensus on what to cut. And Republicans, whose constituents are disproportionately older, have generally refused to vote on entitlement cuts without bipartisan cover from Democrats. In this case Democrats are highly unlikely to give it to them, which complicates their task of passing a debt limit bill.

The Cantor memo makes it all but official that Republicans won’t seek to defund Obamacare in the fiscal battles. The strategy, pushed by conservative activists, to withhold support for keeping the government running after Sept. 30 unless Democrats agree to defund Obamacare. Instead it vows to “hold a series of strategic votes throughout the fall to dismantle, defund, and delay Obamacare.” The memo says Republicans “will continue to pursue the strategy of systematically derailing this train wreck and replacing it with a patient-centered system.”

The GOP’s big stand in the fiscal battles will be to force Obama to accept the lower spending levels ordered by sequestration — automatic spending cuts enacted in 2011 — in a measure to keep the government funded. Here Republicans will refuse to cede and the White House has not suggested it’ll veto a bill that maintains sequester spending levels, although Obama wants to cut a deal to replace the sequester.

“In signing a CR at sequester levels,” Cantor writes, “the President would be endorsing a level of spending that wipes away all the increases he and Congressional Democrats made while they were in charge and returns us to a pre-2008 level of discretionary spending.”

#### Calling in a favor on the plan burns up Obama’s limited leverage with House Republicans

Moore, 9/10 --- Guardian's US finance and economics editor

(Heidi, 9/10/2013, “Syria: the great distraction; Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security,” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)>)

Before President Obama speaks to the nation about Syria tonight, take a look at what this fall will look like inside America.

There are 49 million people in the country who suffered inadequate access to food in 2012, leaving the percentage of "food-insecure" Americans at about one-sixth of the US population. At the same time, Congress refused to pass food-stamp legislation this summer, pushing it off again and threatening draconian cuts.

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.

The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.

Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.

The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.

These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.

More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.

The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.

This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.

Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.

Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:

Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.

Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today.

It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria.

There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.

#### ( ) Entertaining GOP negotiating demands will drag the process out and trigger economic collapse

Lobello, 8/27 --- business editor at TheWeek.com (Carmel, 8/27/2013, “How the looming debt ceiling fight could screw up the U.S. economy; Yup, this is happening — again,” <http://theweek.com/article/index/248775/how-the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-could-screw-up-the-us-economy)>)

Ready for more debt-ceiling drama?

The Treasury Department said Monday it would hit its borrowing limit in mid-October, which means that Congress will need to raise its $16.7 trillion debt ceiling to pay the nation's bills.

The sooner-than-expected deadline comes at an inconvenient moment, because Congress is already facing a budget deadline for the stopgap "continuing resolution" that finances the federal government, which is set to run out September 30. Failure to come to an agreement would trigger a government shutdown.

Having two big deadlines fall two weeks apart could be a recipe for disaster. Republicans, led by Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), have been musing about the possibility of using the debt ceiling, instead of a government shutdown, as leverage to delay the implementation of ObamaCare.

But as Ezra Klein put it in The Washington Post, "Trading a government shutdown for a debt-ceiling breach is like trading the flu for septic shock":

Anything Republicans might fear about a government shutdown is far more terrifying amidst a debt-ceiling breach. The former is an inconvenience. The latter is a global financial crisis. It’s the difference between what happened in 1995, when the government did shutdown, and what happened in 2008, when global markets realized a bedrock investment they thought was safe (housing in that case, U.S. treasuries in this one) was full of risk. [The Washington Post]

Indeed, a debt ceiling debate in 2011 that went on to the last possible minute had real economic consequences, leading Standard & Poor's to downgrade the United States' credit rating. The move "left a clear and deep dent in US economic and market data," said Matt Phillips at Quartz.

Investors pulled huge amounts of cash from the stock market, and consumer confidence was hurt as well. When the same problem cropped up again in May 2012, because Congress failed to reach a long-term deal, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers in Bloomberg explained how confidence plummeted the first time around:

[Confidence] went into freefall as the political stalemate worsened through July. Over the entire episode, confidence declined more than it did following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008. After July 31, when the deal to break the impasse was announced, consumer confidence stabilized and began a long, slow climb that brought it back to its starting point almost a year later. [Bloomberg]

This morning, Wolfers had this to say:

Treasury Secretary Jack Lew visited CNBC Tuesday morning to reiterate President Obama's promise not to go down he same road. "The president has made it clear: We're not going to negotiate over the debt limit," Lew said.

He also explained why in a letter to Boehner Monday morning. "Protecting the full faith and credit of the United States is the responsibility of Congress, because only Congress can extend the nation's borrowing authority," he wrote. "Failure to meet that responsibility would cause irreparable harm to the American economy."

#### This will destroy the U.S. and global economy and collapse trade

Davidson, 9/10 (Adam - co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money” 9/10/2013, “Our Debt to Society,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)>)

This is the definition of a deficit, and it illustrates why the government needs to borrow money almost every day to pay its bills. Of course, all that daily borrowing adds up, and we are rapidly approaching what is called the X-Date — the day, somewhere in the next six weeks, when the government, by law, cannot borrow another penny. Congress has imposed a strict limit on how much debt the federal government can accumulate, but for nearly 90 years, it has raised the ceiling well before it was reached. But since a large number of Tea Party-aligned Republicans entered the House of Representatives, in 2011, raising that debt ceiling has become a matter of fierce debate. This summer, House Republicans have promised, in Speaker John Boehner’s words, “a whale of a fight” before they raise the debt ceiling — if they even raise it at all.

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.

While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.

The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

**US economic collapse causes war and triggers every impact**

O’Hanlon 12 — Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, Accessed 07-12-2012)

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, **moving toward a world free of** nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

### 4

#### *The aff interacts with a flagrant human rights violator - Moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order. Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

### Case

**Default to utilitarianism**

**A) Most ethical—ignoring consequences is tunnel-vision that causes evil**

**Issac 2**—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness **undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of **complicity in injustice**. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that **politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions**; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

**B) Key to equality**

**Cummiskey 90** – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor, AG)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.**

**Western imperialism prevents extinction**

**Locke 4** – professor emeritus, Maryland School of Business (Edwin, 9/30, The Greatness of Western Civilization, http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=3234, AG)

There are three fundamental respects in which **Western culture is objectively the best**. These are the core values or core achievements of Western civilization, and what made America great. Reason. The Greeks were the first to identify philosophically that knowledge is gained through reason and logic as opposed to mysticism (faith, revelation, dogma). It would take two millennia, including a Dark Ages and a Renaissance, before the full implications of Greek thought would be realized. The rule of reason reached its zenith in the West in the 18th century -- the Age of Enlightenment. "For the first time in modern history," writes one philosopher, "an authentic respect for reason became the mark of an entire culture. " America is a product of the Enlightenment. Individual Rights. An indispensable achievement leading to the Enlightenment was the recognition of the concept of individual rights. John Locke demonstrated that individuals do not exist to serve governments, but rather that governments exist to protect individuals. The individual, said Locke, has an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of his own happiness. The result was the United States of America. (Disastrous errors were made in the West -- for example, slavery, which originated elsewhere, and Nazism -- but these were too incongruent with Western values to last and were corrected, by the West, in the name of its core principles of reason and rights.) Science and Technology. The triumph of reason and rights made possible the full development and application of science and technology and ultimately modern industrial society. Reason and rights freed man's mind from the tyranny of religious dogma and freed man's productive capacity from the tyranny of state control. Scientific and technological progress followed in several interdependent steps. Men began to understand the laws of nature. They invented an endless succession of new products. And they engaged in large-scale production, that is, the creation of wealth, which in turn financed and motivated further invention and production. As a result, horse-and-buggies were replaced by automobiles, wagon tracks by steel rails, candles by electricity. At last, after millennia of struggle, man became the master of his environment. The result of the core achievements of Western civilization has been an increase in freedom, wealth, health, comfort, and life expectancy unprecedented in the history of the world. The achievements were greatest in the country where the principles of reason and rights were implemented most consistently -- the United States of America. In contrast, it was precisely in those Eastern and African countries which did not embrace reason, rights, and technology where people suffered (and still suffer) most from both natural and man-made disasters (famine, poverty, illness, dictatorship) and where life-expectancy was (and is) lowest. It is said that primitives live "in harmony with nature," but in reality they are simply victims of the vicissitudes of nature -- if some dictator does not kill them first. The greatness of the West is not an "ethnocentric" prejudice; it is an objective fact. This assessment is based on the only proper standard for judging a government or a society: the degree to which its core values are pro- or anti-life. Pro-life cultures acknowledge and respect man's nature as a rational being who must discover and create the conditions which his survival and happiness require -- which means that they advocate reason, rights, freedom, and technological progress. Despite its undeniable triumphs, Western civilization is by no means secure. Its core principles are under attack from every direction -- by religious fanatics, by dictators and, most disgracefully, by Western intellectuals, who are denouncing reason in the name of skepticism, rights in the name of special entitlements, and progress in the name of environmentalism. We are heading rapidly toward the dead end of nihilism. The core values and achievements of the West and America must be asserted proudly and defended to the death. **Our lives depend on them.**

**There’s no root cause—the only internal link to war is collapse of deterrence**

**Moore 4** Walter L. Brown Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law (John Norton Moore**, “**Solving the War Puzzle: beyond the democratic peace,” pg 41-43)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of many traditional “causes” of war? Past and many contemporary, theories of war and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of “honor”, or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, **there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression.** It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that are the key to most effectively controlling war….Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.

**Realism is inevitable**

**Thayer 4** – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76 //adi]

The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that **there is no world government** compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, **aggressing when forced to** do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call **a self-help system**: leaders of states arc forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was **anarchic**; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great—so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high—without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift—survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. This environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits arc sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, **even if they must hurt other humans** or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to **maximize their power**, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family's or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).

**Threats real—default to expert consensus**

**Knudsen 1 –** PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn(Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this **emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception** of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence or whatever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur **simultaneously to large numbers of politicians**, and hardly most of the time. During the cold War, threats—in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger—referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which areperceived to be **threatening**. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real—it is the utterance itself that is the act.’ The deliberate disregard for objective actors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Waever’s joint article of the same year. As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article. This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the consequent ‘politics of panic,’ as Waever aptly calls it. Now, here—in the case of urgency—another baby is thrown our with the Waeverian bathwater. When situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of ‘abolishing’ threatening phenomena ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with **a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back** and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

**Predictions are key to rational decision-making—even if they’re not accurate you shouldn’t reject them**

**Fitzsimmons 7** (Michael, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06/07)

Much has been made about the defining role of uncertainty in strategic plan- ning since the end of the Cold War. With the end of bipolar competition, so the argument goes, and the accelerating pace of change in technology and inter- national political and economic relations, forecasting world events even a few years into the future has become exceedingly difficult. Indeed, few in the year 2000 would have described with much accuracy the current conditions facing national-security decision-makers. Moreover, history offers ample evidence, from the Schlieffen Plan to the Soviet economy, that rigid planning creates risks of catastrophic failure. Clearly, uncertainty demands an appreciation for the importance of flexibility in strategic planning. For all of its importance, however, recognition of uncertainty poses a dilemma for strategists: in predicting the future, they are likely to be wrong; but in resisting prediction, they risk **clouding the rational bases for making strategic choices.** Over-confidence in prediction may lead to good preparation for the wrong future, but wholesale dismissal of prediction may lead a strategist to spread ~~his~~ resources too thinly. In pursuit of flexibility, he ends up well pre- pared for nothing. A natural compromise is to build strategies that are robust across multiple alternative future events but are still tailored to meet the chal- lenges of the most likely future events. Recent US national security strategy, especially in the Department of Defense, has veered from this middle course and placed too much emphasis on the role of uncertainty. This emphasis, paradoxically, illustrates the hazards of both too much allowance for uncertainty and too little. Current policies on nuclear-force planning and the results of the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) are examples of overreaching for strategic flexibility. The record of planning for post-war operations in Iraq, by contrast, indicates that decision-makers, in enlisting uncertainty as a rationale for discounting one set of predictions, have fallen prey to overconfidence in their own alternative set of predictions. A more balanced approach to accounting for uncertainty in strategic plan- ning would address a wide range of potential threats and security challenges, but would also incorporate explicit, transparent, probabilistic reasoning into planning processes. The main benefit of such an approach would not neces- sarily be more precise predictions of the future, but rather **greater clarity and discipline applied to the difficult judgements about the future** upon which strategy depends.

**Threat con stops genocide**

**Reinhard 4** – Professor of Comparative Literature, UCLA (Kenneth, Towards a Political-Theology of the Neighbor, http://www.cjs.ucla.edu/Mellon/Towards\_Political\_Theology.pdf, AG)

A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stablility, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous – forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

**No impact**

**O’Kane 97 –** Prof Comparative Political Theory, U Keele (Rosemary, “Modernity, the Holocaust and politics,” Economy and Society 26:1, p 58-9, AG)

Modern bureaucracy is not 'intrinsically capable of genocidal action' (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very 'ordinary and common' attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

**security as a specific concept can’t be deconstructed. The ethical response is to engage in scenario planning and try to minimize violence**

**Weaver 2k** - Ole International relations theory and the politics of European integration, p. 284-285

The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices a nd deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formations. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commit­ment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical trans­formation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instan­tiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies.  In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engage­ment' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsi­bility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. **Security is a** much **more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics**. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would be no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in *what* terms)? Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of pre­empting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

#### The Alt fails

#### Neoliberalism is inevitable and self-reinforcing

**Peck 2**—Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy and Professor of Geography, University of British Columbia. Former Honourary Professorial Fellow, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester. PhD in Geography. AND—Adam Tickell—Professor of Geography, University of Bristol. PhD (Jamie, Neoliberalizing space, Antipode 34 (3): 380-404, AMiles)

In many respects, it would be tempting to conclude with a Ideological reading of neoliberalism, as if it were somehow locked on a course of increasing vulnerability to crisis. Yet this would be both politically complacent and theoretically erroneous. One of the most striking features of the recent history of neoliberalism is its quite remarkable transformative capacity. To a greater extent than many would have predicted, including ourselves, neoliberalism has demonstrated an ability to absorb or displace crisis tendencies, to ride—and capitalize upon—the very economic cycles and localized policy failures that it was complicit in creating, and to erode the foundations upon which generalized or extralocal resistance might be constructed. The transformative potential—and consequent political durability—of neoliberalism has been repeatedly underestimated, and reports of its death correspondingly exaggerated. Although antiglobalization protests have clearly disrupted the functioning of "business as usual" for some sections of the neoliberal elite, the underlying power structures of neoliberalism remain substantially intact. What remains to be seen is how far these acts of resistance, asymmetrical though the power relations clearly are, serve to expose the true character of neoliberalism as a political project. In its own explicit politicization, then, the resistance movement may have the capacity to hold a mirror to the process of (ostensibly apolitical) neoliberalization, revealing its real character, scope, and consequences.

**War is the root cause of racism**

**Mertus, ethics prof, 99** – Professor and co-director of the Ethics and Peace program, American University's School of International Service (Julie, The Role of Racism as a Cause or Factor in Wars and Civil Conflict, International Council on Human Rights Policy, http://www.ichrp.org/paper\_files/112\_w\_01.pdf, AG)

The war impacted on national identity in three ways. First, it accomplished the complete demonization of other nations and national groups. Initially, state-controlled propaganda machines broadcast stories of the “other’s” inhumanity. Overtime many witnesses and victims of acts of great cruelty began to tell their story – and their neighbours listened. Second, war hastened physical national segregation. People who had been forced to leave their villages and cities because of their national background now crowded into new cities, creating new enclaves of “their own people.” Segregation exploited and reinforced otherness. Finally, war closed the ranks. People throughout the former Yugoslavia were forced to decide who they were among three narrow choices: Serb, Croat, or Muslim. This left four categories of people without an identity: those of mixed parentage or marriage; those who were of another national identity, such as Albanian or Hungarian; those who wanted to identify themselves as something else, either above the nation, such as European, or below the nation, such as a member of a particular neighbourhood or organisation; and those who wanted out of the labelling process altogether. Those who failed to make a choice usually left the country (if they could) or fell silent; a few stubbornly fought back, despite the extreme backlash against anything different and potentially challenging to the nation. II. Characteristics of Conflicts with Racial Dimension: Roles of Racism The above discussion demonstrates a primary characteristic of conflicts with a racial dimension. Political mobilisation linked to real and imagined group differences arises where the state’s administrative structures and legal institutions distribute scarce resources based on ethnic/national differences. The problem is particularly acute where, as in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, lead positions in military and police forces are distributed based on group identity.20 Yugoslavia and Rwanda are textbook examples of cases in which the controlling entity (the state, the party, the colonial entity) “for its own administrative convenience and in order to improve control over local élites, may select certain ethnic élites and organisations as collaborators or channels for the transmission of 7 government patronage.”21 This favouritism based on group identity serves to polarise societies and, additionally, to institutionalise and make acceptable intra-group suspicion and hatred. In Rwanda and Kosovo, polarisation and racism played a role, not as the root cause of conflict, but as a tool of élites. In both Rwanda and Kosovo, many of those who participated in the propaganda inciting racism, were intellectuals.22 It is characteristic of conflicts with a racist dimension that élites have the ability to manipulate racism because of other conditions in-country, such as: structural poverty, unmet human development needs, comparative deprivation of one group to another, media manipulation of misunderstandings among the general populace, and the absence of human rights, the rule of law and civil and political institutions encouraging citizen participation. Where a group perceives a threat to its interests and values, rising counter-élites find playing the racist/nationalist/ chauvinist card a particularly useful tool to assert a right to rule to protect the “true” national or ethnic interest. In Rwanda and Kosovo, extremist élites played upon the deep fears and frustrations of the populace.

**Racism is has substantially declining—sole focus on it in present times is counterproductive**

**McWhorter, linguistics prof, 8**—Stanford. senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. Nominated for an NAACP Image Award for Outstanding Literary Work in Non-Fiction. PhD in linguistic (John, June 5, 2008; “Racism in Retreat;” The Sun, http://www.nysun.com/opinion/racism-in-retreat/79355/)

His victory demonstrates the main platform of my race writing. The guiding question in everything I have ever written on race is: Why do so many people exaggerate about racism? This exaggeration is a nasty hangover from the sixties, and the place it has taken as a purported badge of intellectual and moral gravitas is a tire-block on coherent, constructive sociopolitical discussion. Here's a typical case for what passes as enlightenment. On my desk(top) is an article from last year's American Psychologist. The wisdom imparted? To be a person of color these days is to withstand an endless barrage of racist "microaggressions." Say to someone, "When I look at you, I don't see color" and you "deny their ethnic experiences." You do the same by saying, "As a woman, I know what you go through as a racial minority," as well as with hate speech such as "America is a melting pot." Other "microaggressions" include college buildings being all named after straight, white rich men (I'm not kidding about the straight part). This sort of thing will not do. Why channel mental energy into performance art of this kind? Some may mistake me as implying that it would be okay to stop talking about racism. But that interpretation is incorrect: I am stating that it would be okay to stop talking about racism. We need to be talking about serious activism focused on results. Those who suppose that the main meal in the aforementioned is to decry racism are not helping people. At this point, if racism was unattended to for 10 years, during that time it would play exactly the same kind of role it does in America now — elusive, marginal, and insignificant. Note that I did not say that there was no racism. There seems to be an assumption that when discussing racism, it is a sign of higher wisdom to neglect the issue of its degree. This assumption is neither logical nor productive. I reject it, and am pleased to see increasing numbers of black people doing same. Of course there is racism. The question is whether there is enough to matter. All evidence shows that there is not. No, the number of black men in prison is not counterevidence: black legislators were solidly behind the laws penalizing possession of crack more heavily than powder. In any case, to insist that we are hamstrung until every vestige of racism, bias, or inequity is gone indicates a grievous lack of confidence, which I hope any person of any history would reject. Anyone who intones that America remains permeated with racism is, in a word, lucky. They have not had the misfortune of living in a society riven by true sociological conflict, such as between Sunnis and Shiites, Hutus and Tutsis — or whites and blacks before the sixties. It'd be interesting to open up a discussion with a Darfurian about "microaggressions." To state that racism is no longer a serious problem in our country is neither ignorant nor cynical. Warnings that such a statement invites a racist backlash are, in 2008, melodramatic. They are based on no empirical evidence. Yet every time some stupid thing happens — some comedian says a word, some sniggering blockhead hangs a little noose, some study shows that white people tend to get slightly better car loans — we are taught that racism is still mother's milk in the U.S. of A. "Always just beneath the surface." Barack Obama's success is the most powerful argument against this way of thinking in the entire four decades since recreational underdoggism was mistaken as deep thought. A black man clinching the Democratic presidential nomination — and rather easily at that — indicates that racism is a lot further "beneath the surface" than it used to be. And if Mr. Obama ends up in the White House, then it might be time to admit that racism is less beneath the surface than all but fossilized.

Gender inequality is inevitable

**Fukuyama, prof of IR, 98—**Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the International Development Program at Johns Hopkins. BA in classics from Cornell. PhD in government from Harvard (Francis, “Women and the Evolution of World Politics,” September 1998, http://www.evoyage.com/Evolutionary%20Feminism/ForAffairWomen&Evolution.htm, AMiles)

It is clear that this violence was largely perpetrated by men. While small minorities of human societies have been matrilineal, evidence of a primordial matriarchy in which women dominated men, or were even relatively equal to men, has been hard to find. There was no age of innocence. The line from chimp to modern man is continuous.

It would seem, then, that there is something to the contention of many feminists that phenomena like aggression, violence, war, and intense competition for dominance in a status hierarchy are more closely associated with men than women. Theories of international relations like realism that see international politics as a remorseless struggle for power are in fact what feminist call a gendered perspective, describing the behavior of states controlled by men rather than states per se. A world run by women would follow different rules, it would appear, and it is toward that sort of world that all postindustrial or Western societies are moving. As women gain power in these countries, the latter should become less aggressive, adventurous, competitive and violent.

The problem with the feminist view is that is sees these attitudes toward violence, power, status as wholly the products of a patriarchal culture, whereas in fact it appears they are rooted in biology. This makes these attitudes harder to change in men and consequently in societies. Despite the rise of women, men will continue to play a major, if not dominant, part in the governance of postindustrial countries, not to mention less-developed ones. The realms of war and international politics in particular will remain controlled by men for longer than many feminists would like. Most important, the task of resocializing men to be more like women - that is, less violent - will run into limits. What is bred in the bone cannot be altered easily by changes in culture and ideology.

**Gender isn’t the root cause of war**

**Goldstein, IR prof, 1**—Professor of International Relations at American University, 2001 (Joshua S., War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, pp.411-412)

I began this book hoping to contribute in some way to a deeper understanding of war – an understanding that would improve the chances of someday achieving real peace, by deleting war from our human repertoire. In following the thread of gender running through war, I found the deeper understanding I had hoped for – a multidisciplinary and multilevel engagement with the subject. Yet I became somewhat more pessimistic about how quickly or easily war may end. The war system emerges, from the evidence in this book, as relatively ubiquitous and robust. Efforts to change this system must overcome several dilemmas mentioned in this book. First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

## Grapevine – 2NC – Rd. 1

### 2NC – Overview (China econ) (0:50)

#### The DA outweighs and turns the case:

#### 1) Chinese econ – the aff causes anti-Chinese sentiment – that collapses Chinese export markets and prevents them from achieving growth targets – that causes instability, repression, and migration – escalates to global collapse, loose nukes, and lashout.

#### 2) Framing – outweighs on magnitude – triggers global escalation and retaliation – prefer it – you can only die once and Chinese instability makes every global problem worse – tanks relations – solves and turns every impact in the 1AC

Cohen 9 (William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309\_mcgiffert\_uschinasmartpower\_web.pdf)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation. The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitor—deliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike— analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognize—and accept—that the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another. These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the past As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability, owing to its recent economic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement of—and cooperation between—the United States and China. The United States and China—the worlds first- and third-largest economies—are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China, previously the twin engines of global growth, has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignite simmering trade tensions between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States and China more clear than in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves and is the world's largest holder—by far—of U.S. government debt. Former treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances created by this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet. China will almost certainly be called on to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and recovery package. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's February 23.2009, reassurance to Beijing that U.S. markets remain safe and her call for continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as a means to help both countries, and the world, emerge from global recession underscored the shared interest—and central role—that both countries have in turning around the global economy quickly. Although China's considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling problem, they are now being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution. Similarly, as the worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States share not only the collateral damage of energy-inefficient economic growth, but a primary responsibility to shape any ultimate global solutions to climate change. To date, cooperation has been elusive, owing as much to Washington's reluctance as to Beijing's intransigence. Painting China as the environmental bogeyman as an excuse for foot-dragging in policymaking is no longer an option; for its part, China, as the world's top polluter, must cease playing the developing-economy card. Yet energy security and climate change remain an area of genuine opportunity for joint achievement. Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation in this field is a sine qua non of any response to the energy and climate challenges. The sheer size of the Chinese economy means that collaboration with the United States could set the de facto global standards for etficiency and emissions in key economic sectors such as industry and transportation. Climate change also provides an area for cooperation in previously uncharted policy waters, as in emerging Arctic navigational and energy exploration opportunities. Washington and Beijing also share a deep and urgent interest in international peace and stability. The resumption of U.S.-China military contacts is a positive development. As two nuclear powers with worldwide economic and strategic interests, both countries want to minimize instability and enhance maritime security, as seen by parallel antipiracy missions in the waters otT Somalia. Joint efforts in support of United Nations peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism offer critical areas for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Certainly, regional and global security institutions such as the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea or the UN Security Council require the active engagement of both Washington and Beijing. Even more broadly, crisis management in geographic regions of mutual strategic interest like the Korean peninsula, Iran, or Burma require much more Sino-U.S. communication if the two countries are to avoid miscalculation and maximize opportunities to minimize human sutfering. Increasing the number of mid-level military-to-military exchanges would help in this regard. The United States and China could do more to cooperate on law enforcement to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Western China. Afghanistan is competing with Burma as the main provider of narcotics to China; Washington could use its influence with the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul to develop a joint antinarcotics program. This could potentially build networks and joint capabilities that might be useful for U.S.-China cooperation on the issue of Pakistan. In addition, Washington should also encourage NATO-China cooperation along the Afghan border. Collaborating under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might provide an additional framework for Beijing and Washington to address Central Asian security issues in a cooperative manner. 1he SCO, which includes Pakistan as an observer and will convene a multinational conference on Afghanistan in March 2009, has long made curbing narcoterrorism in Afghanistan a priority. In addition, the VS. Drug Enforcement Agency and the Chinese Anti-Narcotics Bureau should expand cooperation on interdiction and prosecution of heroin and meth traffickers. To be sure, there are a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington and Beijing. This should surprise no one. The United States has disagreements with even its allies. Two large powers with vastly different histories, cultures, and political systems are bound to have challenges. History has shown, however, that the most effective way of addressing issues is for the U.S. and Chinese governments to engage in quiet diplomacy rather than public recrimination. In the U.S.-China context, there is often little to be gained—and much to be lost in terms of trust and respect—by a polarizing debate. Any differences, moreover, must not necessarily impede Sino-U.S. cooperation when both sides share strong mutual interests. I;. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function."3 Effective policy toward China by the United States, and vice versa, will require this kind of dual-minded intelligence. Moreover, working together on areas of mutual and global interest will help promote strategic trust between China and the United States, facilitating possible cooperation in other areas. Even limited cooperation on specific areas will help construct additional mechanisms for bilateral communication on issues of irreconcilable disagreement. In fact, many of the toughest challenges in U.S.-China relations in recent years have been the result of unforeseen events, such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the EP-3 reconnaissance plane collision in April 2001. Building trust and finding workable solutions to tough problems is the premise behind the Obama administrations foreign policy of smart power, as articulated by Secretary of State Clinton. Smart power is based on, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her confirmation hearing, the fundamental belief that 'We must use... the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation."' As the CS1S Commission on Smart Power noted in November 2007, "Smart Power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels... .°5 As such, smart power necessarily mandates a major investment in a U.S.-China partnership on key issues. 'The concept enjoys broad support among the Chinese and American people and, by promoting the global good, it reaps concrete results around the world. There should be no expectation that Washington and Beijing will or should agree on all, or even most, questions. But the American and Chinese people should expect their leaders to come together on those vital issues that require their cooperation. U.S.-China partnership, though not inevitable, is indispensable.

### 2NC – CCP collapse (0:30)

#### **Chinese growth prevents global economic collapse, war over Taiwan and CCP collapse**

Lewis 8 [Dan, Research Director – Economic Research Council, “The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse,” World Finance, 5/13, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html]

In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the world’s largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned “China Hands” rejected Chang’s thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right. China’s expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter – which we in the West hear very little about – are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm – after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas. Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise – fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state. According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

#### Regime instability causes lashout and nuclear war

Renxing, 05 (Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, (a privately owned Falon-Gong linked newspaper) August 3, 2005, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death” <http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html>)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

### 2NC – Economic integration (0:45)

#### Chinese-Latin American relations are key to model economic integration and trade partnerships

Shicheng 11 Xu Shicheng is researcher of the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Vice President of the Chinese Latin American Studies Association “Greater China-Latin America Global and Regional Cooperation <http://en.el-emergente.com/asia-pacific/china/greater-china-latin-america-global-and-regional-cooperation/#sthash.Xd9RwAKI.dpuf]//BMitch>

China has maintained close contacts and dialogues with regional organizations for some years now, including the Group of Rio, the Andine Community, and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). These links and China’s dialogue with the region will only become stronger. In 2004, China was admitted to the Organization of American States (OAS) as a permanent observer. In the same year, China also become observer to the Latin American Parliament and, in 2008, entered the Interamerican Development Bank. China and Caribbean countries with diplomatic links have successfully hosted two instances of the China-Caribbean Economic and Commercial Cooperation Forum. This year’s edition will take place in Trinidad and Tobago. The contacts and cooperation with these political and economical regional organizations are more and more intense. In February of last year, the Latin America / Caribbean Unity Summit celebrated in Cancun, Mexico, unanimously decided to establish the Latin America / Caribbean Community (CELAC), with the aim of increasing the right to have a Latin American voice at the international level. This Community will be officially established sometime in 2011 or 2012 and we anticipate that China will establish relations with this organization that encompasses all countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. China and 18 Latin American nations have actively participated in the conversations taking place in the East Asia-Latin American Cooperation Forum. China, Mexico, Chile, and Peru, are APEC members and, within this framework, cooperation between China and these three Latin American nations has grown. In the coming five years, more Latin American countries will participate in these dialogue forums. Since 2007, to promote economic and commercial bilateral relations, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, along with equivalent Latin American institutions and the Inter-American Development Bank, has organized in four instances the China-Latin America Business Summit. The fifth edition will take place this year in Peru. In sum, over the last years, contacts between China and regional Latin American organizations have grown. In the next decade, as relations between both regions grow and become deeper, regional cooperation will only become stronger and will spur an important regional economic integration.

#### Those are key to solve global governance

Grant and Valasek 11[Charles Grant has been director of the Centre for European Reform since its foundation in 1998. He is the author of many CER publications, including, most re c e n t l y, ‘European choices for Gord o n B rown’ (July 2007) and ‘Euro p e ’s blurred boundaries: re t h i n k i n g e n l a rgementandneighbourhoodpolicy’(October2006).He pre v i o u s l y worked at TheEconomist,writing abouttheCity,the EUanddefence. Tomas Valasek is director of foreign policy and defence atthe Centre for European Reform. He has written extensively on transatlantic relations,European foreign and security policy, and defence industrial issues. He previously worked as policy director and head of the security and defence policy divisionat the Slovak Ministry ofDefence. “Preparing for the multipolar world European foreign and security policy in 2020”]//BMitch

By 2020 the world will need new institutions, both formal and informal, to manage the stresses and strains of globalisation, especially in the spheres of economics, the environment and security; and to accommodate the rise of new powers**.** The post-Kyoto framework for tackling climate change will certainly require permanent institutions to make it effective. Similarly, attempts to control the proliferation and numbers of dangerous weapons generally require treaties and organisations that most governments sign up to. But many other challenges would be better served by small, informal groups of the most relevant countries. For example, the world will want a smooth and stable energy market – one that avoids sudden ﬂuctuations of price, or breaks of supply. A group consisting of the most important suppliers and consumers – say the US, the EU, China, Russia, India, Brazil and Saudi Arabia (and perhaps Iran, one day) – could co-operate to ensure a benign and predictable energy market. Most other countries would be happy to follow the guidelines set by such a group. The same principle could apply to global capital markets, which are dominated by just a few ﬁnancial centres (the Financial Action Task Force, a group of governments that tackles money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing, has established a good reputation). The i n t e r-linked problems of international terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration are also probably best tackled in informal forums. Perhaps the grandest of the smaller groups will be that which replaces the G-8: by 2020 the club of the world’s leading economies will surely include Brazil, China, India and South Africa. So long as the smaller, informal groups set guidelines and benchmarks for others to follow, rather than rules and regulations, they will not undermine the formal institutions of global governance. The EU should lead the way in establishing new bodies, whether formal or informal. One of its special contributions to the multipolar world is that it understands – better than any conventional power – the beneﬁts of international co-operation, institutions and rules.

#### That solves and turns all impacts

Kupchan 12 \*Charles Kupchan is a professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations [No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, book]

For the West to speak out against political repression and overt violations of the rule of law is not only warranted but obligatory. But to predicate constructive relations with rising powers on their readiness to embrace a Western notion of legitimacy is another matter altogether. Senator John McCain is off course in insisting that "It is the democracies of the world that will provide the pillars upon which we can and must build an enduring peace."— On the contrary, only if the West works cooperatively with all regimes willing to reciprocate—democracies and nondemocracies alike—will it be able to build an enduring peace. Terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security, water and food security, financial crisis—these challenges are global in nature and can be effectively addressed only in partnership with a wide array of countries. It makes little sense for the West to denigrate and ostracize regimes whose cooperation it needs to fashion a secure new order; the stakes are too high. Western countries only harm their own interests when they label as illegitimate governments that are not liberal democracies. Recognizing the next world's inevitable political diversity and thereby consolidating cooperation with rising powers of diverse regime type is far more sensible than insisting on the universality of Western conceptions of legitimacy—and alienating potential partners. The West and rising rest must arrive at a new, more inclusive, notion of legitimacy if they are to agree on an ideological foundation for the next world.

### 2NC – Link overview (0:40)

#### Aff crowds out China:

#### 1) New hemispheric tone – causes bandwagoning to the US which disrupts Chinese trade blocs and creates an uncertain investment environment.

#### 2) Perception – shared history and culture mean countries will switch sides if we show interest – proximity supercharges the link

Ben Ami 13 (Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace “Is the US Losing Latin America?” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami)

Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

#### 3) Empirics – Columbia pushed China out after we funded their war on FARC – affecting ideology is key – spills over to regional market access

Ellis 2011(R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60\_85-91\_Ellis.pdf)//VP

It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

### 2NC – Link (generic zero-sum)

#### Relations are zero-sum:

#### 1) Financing locus – US proximity means we step in

Menendez 13 (Fernando Menéndez, an economist and principal of Cordoba Group International LLC, 3-28-13, China US Focus, “The Counterbalance in America’s Backyard”, web)

From the perspective of Latin America’s foreign policy makers, China is undeniably a welcome economic, and potentially political, counterbalance to the U.S., especially given the objectives of some Latin American countries. Despite its preoccupation with the Middle East and its recent economic troubles, the U.S. remains a predominant actor in the region, and only the presence of a country capable of projecting superior economic and political power could significantly shift the balance of forces away from the current hegemon. Moreover, unlike the former Soviet Union – once described as a third world country with nuclear weapons – China has the economic resources to create an alternative locus of financing, trade and development. China’s foreign policy has long sought stable and positive relations with the U.S. in order to ensure optimal conditions for domestic economic growth. Economic considerations often proved paramount to its foreign policy, avoiding tensions where possible. Nevertheless, as China projects itself in the Americas, conflicts with the United States are likely. As the U.S. loses market share, faces higher costs for raw materials, as American investors find fewer opportunities, and especially if Latin American nations try to entangle China in regional tensions, U.S. political and military moves in East Asia may raise China’s cost of doing business in the Americas. Similarly, perceived or actual ties between some Chinese companies and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will undoubtedly raise concerns from America’s national security apparatus.

#### 2) US decline proves

Mallen 13(<http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981> Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For The US? By Patricia Rey Mallén on June 28 2013 nkj)

As if to confirm the declining hegemony of the United States as the ruling global superpower, China is gaining influence in its hemispheric "backyard," Secretary of State John Kerry's unintentionally insulting designation for Latin America. China has had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a competitive trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several countries there. The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. “[The U.S.'] attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on America’s list of priorities. China has been all too willing to fill any void,” Cerna said. Related Will Nicaragua’s New Canal Overshadow Panama’s? A Tale Of Two Trips: Latin America Reacts To Xi and Biden's Visits Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. China’s share of the region’s trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent. As impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its commercial relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade, adding up to $560 billion in 2008. Notably, though, America’s trade participation in Latin America has remained static, while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having already surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil. Concomitant with this burgeoning interest from the Far East, Latin America is undergoing an economic rebirth. After decades of devastating economic crises, the region is experiencing unprecedented growth: On average, annual GDP growth for Latin American countries will be 3.7 percent this year, according to United Nations estimates, almost double the average for the rest of the world. That has prompted several countries to form quasi-governmental entities to further promote the progress of the region. One such entity is the recently formed Pacific Alliance. Born with the specific goal of increasing relations with Asia, its members include Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Peru, which together represent half of the region’s total exports and 35 percent of its GDP. In a meeting in Colombian capital Bogotá last month, the Pacific Alliance signed an agreement to open its member countries' economies to Asian markets; the U.S., despite an invitation, did not attend. Though a recent trip to the region by Vice President Joe Biden seems to run counter to the Pacific Alliance snub, China’s President Xi Jinping has also visited recently, and likewise met with Latin American leaders, illustrating how the two global powers are going after the same prize. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden (c.) visited the Santa Marta slum in Rio de Janeiro in May. REUTERS/Victor R. Caivano/Pool Biden traveled to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil in May, with the last leg of his trip coinciding with the beginning of Xi’s in Trinidad, before jumping to Costa Rica and Mexico. Both leaders met with several Latin American presidents and discussed trade and cooperation. The outcomes of their trips were very different, however. Xi’s trip was the first visit from a Chinese official to the region in almost a decade. Trinidad and Tobago’s main newspaper, Newsday, called the visit a “historic occasion” and a “visit from China to a good friend.” Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said she was committed to boosting relations with China and accepted an invitation to Beijing for November of this year. In Costa Rica, Xi signed a $400 million loan to build a cross-country road and reaffirmed relations with its main ally in the region. Costa Rica is the only country in Latin America that sides with China in the mainland-Taiwanese dispute and does not recognize the island as a nation. Even more significant was Xi’s visit to Mexico. President Enrique Peña Nieto welcomed his Chinese counterpart, whom he had visited in Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations with China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import -- an important development considering that Mexico is, for now, America's biggest trade partner in the world. China's President Xi Jinping (l.) and first lady Peng Liyuan walk together during a visit at the archaeological site of Chichen Itza in the peninsula of Yucatan June 6, 2013. Xi and his wife were on a three-day official visit to Mexico. REUTERS/Victor Ruiz Garcia Biden’s visit was not as successful. His meeting in Trinidad and Tobago was called “brutal and tense” by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist Andrés Oppenheimer deemed the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America “Washington’s backyard” in a much-berated slip last April. While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and Bogotá, no agreements were signed during his trip. Perhaps the biggest development in China’s investment in the area is the recent decision by the Nicaraguan congress to allow a Chinese company to build a canal through the country. Although still in the proposal stages, the project would bring profound change to the geopolitics of the region -- and even the world. If built, the canal could significantly affect commerce through the Panama Canal, which, though it is now part of Panama's domain, was built by the U.S. and remains a symbol of the nation's historical dominance in the region. That dominance is in decline. After decades of uncontested U.S. influence in the region, some Latin American leaders have started making decidedly anti-American policies. The most notable was the late Venezuelan Comandante Hugo Chávez, who was very vocal about his disdain for the U.S., but he is far from the only one. Bolivia's President Evo Morales, for instance, kicked out USAID after Kerry's verbal slip, and has gone so far as to ban Coca-Cola from the country. But now it's Ecuador bumping heads with its northern neighbor, mostly in regard to Ecuador granting entry to NSA-secrets leaker Edward Snowden. President Rafael Correa openly said that they would welcome the whistle-blower because he was a "free man," no matter what the U.S. said. Disagreements between the governments have led to the cancellation of a special trade agreement, which Ecuador has called "an instrument of blackmail." The SS Kroonland transits the newly opened Panama Canal on Feb. 2, 1915, via the Culebra Cut. The canal has long symbolized U.S. dominance in the region. Underwood & Underwood (public domain) Beyond the lack of understanding with its former main trade partner, why is Latin America so smitten with China? Kevin Gallagher, a professor of international relations at Boston University, says China speaks to the region’s newfound confidence. “China is offering attractive deals to Latin American economies while the United States continues to lecture and dictate,” Gallagher wrote for The Globalist. “For too long, the United States has relied on a rather imperial mechanism, just telling Latin America what it needs,” he added. “Compare that to China’s approach: It offers Latin America what it wants.” Gallagher argued that the U.S.’ biggest offer to Latin America is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which offers access to the U.S. market on three conditions: deregulate financial markets, adopt intellectual property provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms, and allow U.S. firms to sue governments for violating any of its conditions. China, on the other hand, has been providing more financing to Latin America than the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank combined since 2003, with no previous conditions and very few strings attached. “Latin America is very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the IMF and the World Bank,” Gallagher said. “China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditionalities.” Gallagher said the U.S. should awake from its past slumber and stop taking Latin America for granted. Shlomo Ben-Ami, vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace and former Israeli foreign minister, takes a different stance. He argues that China's advancement in the region does not automatically equate with American loss of preeminence. U.S. exports to Latin America continue to rise (by 94 percent over the past six years), as do imports (87 percent in the same period), and America continues to be the biggest foreign investor in the area. Perhaps even more crucial are America's cultural and historical ties to the region, Ben-Ami said. “Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos’ influence in the U.S., it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China,” he said. Still, Gallagher and Ben-Ami agree that the U.S. needs to step up, both economically and diplomatically, to compete with new influences in a part of the world that was until recently widely considered America’s domain. “Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure U.S. influence -- in Latin America or anywhere else,” Ben-Ami said. “It is high time for the U.S. government to undertake a true rethink of its economic policy toward Latin America,” Gallagher observed. “Very soon, it might be too late.”

#### 3) Resources and markets prove – influence is key

Regenstreif 13(The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America By Gary Regenstreif JUNE 12, 2013 <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/> nkj)

Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a “new model” of cooperation at their weekend summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before President Barack Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Beijing and Washington’s sights are set on a similar prize — and face differing challenges to attain it. Their focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic reforms have pulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both China and the United States need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals. Consider the travel itinerary: Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chile’s president paid Obama a visit last week, Peru’s leader arrived Tuesday and Brazil’s is due in October. Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation. Both U.S. and Chinese officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading trade position against China — which has money to burn in the region. “There is a more energetic [U.S.] tone, a more optimistic mood about economic agenda in second term than [the] first time,” Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington policy group, told me. “There’s something happening in the region and the U.S. wants to be part of it. Whether there’s a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question. But there is more of an affirmation of the region and a willingness to engage.” The United States, Latin America’s largest trading partner throughout much of its history, still retains this position. Washington has now signed free trade agreements with more than a third of the hemisphere’s nations and annually exchanges more than $800 billion in goods and services with Latin America — more than three times the region’s commerce with China. In Obama’s first term, however, the administration was widely viewed as neglecting Latin America. And China has moved in fast. China built its annual trade with the region from virtually nothing in 2000 to about $260 billion in 2012. In 2009, it overtook the United States as the largest trading partner of Brazil, the region’s powerhouse — largely through massive purchases of iron ore and soy. Other data is telling: In 1995, for example, the United States accounted for 37 percent of Brazil’s foreign direct investment. That dropped to 10 percent in 2011, according to the Council of the Americas, which seeks to foster hemispheric ties. Washington’s renewed ardor is at least partly because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America the economic success it has built in Africa. China has been able to present itself as a benevolent partner there, which has played well against the West’s history of meddling in domestic affairs. “It’s about influence and leverage,” said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas, “…The region matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than [in the] patronizing way it happened in the past.”

### 2NC – AT: Enviro turn

**Amazonian deforestation decreasing**

**WWF 9**—Word Wildlife Fund (Falling Amazon deforestation rates create opportunity for other damaged forests, 13 November 2009, http://www.panda.org/?180561/Falling-Amazon-deforestation-rates-create-opportunity-for-other-damaged-forests, AMiles)

Fewer trees were cut down in the Amazon this year, creating an opportunity to apply sound government policies to halt deforestation in other damaged forests, WWF says. Data released Thursday by the Brazilian government shows that the deforestation rate in the Amazon fell between August 2008 and July 2009. Overall, the deforested region is a 45 percent smaller than Amazon land cleared the previous year, or between August 2007 and July 2008. This is the lowest rate of deforestation in the Amazon since record-keeping began in 2000, and down from a high of more than 27,000 square kms in 2004. However, the Amazon did lose 7,008 square kms of forest this year, according to government officials and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who attended a ceremony Thursday to announce this year’s deforestation figures. According to Denise Hamú, WWF-Brazil's CEO, although it is essential to recognize the efforts made by the federal and state governments as well as Brazilian society in general, further action is required.

**Amazon destruction inevitable—warming and deforestation**

**Fearnside, ecology prof, 6** – leading expert on the Amazon; Professor of Ecology, National Institute for Research in the Amazon (Philip, 10/23, Amazon conservation efforts must come soon, http://news.mongabay.com/2006/1023-interview\_fearnside.html, AG)

Deforestation is progressing rapidly, and if continued for 20 or 50 years the results would be disastrous. However, it is very important not to succumb to the fatalism that so often affects discussions of Amazonia. What happens depends on human decisions. This includes not only the direct deforestation that is destroying the forest, but also the climate changes that threaten to destroy the forest even without further clearing. Global warming is believed to be the cause of observed increases in the frequency of El Niño events, which are caused by warm surface water in the Pacific Ocean. Most climate models now predict “permanent” El Niño-like conditions to develop in the Pacific. One climate model (the Hadley Center model of the UK Meteorological Office) shows this permanent El Niño resulting in catastrophic die off of Amazonian forest by 2080 if global warming is unchecked

**Amazon resilient**

**Budiansky 93** – Atlantic Monthly correspondent (Stephen, 12/5, The Doomsday Myths, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/931213/archive\_016280\_print.htm, AG)

Similarly, the Atlantic coastal forests of Brazil have been cut to about 12 percent of their original size, yet a team of Brazilian zoologists that combed the forests recently could not confirm a single case of extinction. Instead, they rediscovered several birds and six species of butterfly considered extinct 20 years ago. And a survey by the Flora Meso-Americana project found increased abundance of some species considered threatened. "Despite extensive inquiries, we have been unable to obtain conclusive evidence to support the suggestion that massive extinctions have taken place in recent times," writes Vernon Heywood, a former chief scientist of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, which works with governments to protect endangered species and habitats. Natural resilience. Biologists offer several explanations for such "unreasonable" tenacity of species. Many tropical species are widely dispersed, so the loss of one chunk of a forest does not doom them to extinction. Moreover, ecosystems like the Brazilian Atlantic forests may be naturally resilient, having evolved mechanisms to cope with the severe natural upheavals that are endemic to a mountainous climate subject to heavy rains and sudden cold spells.

### 2nc util

#### Prefer our impact framing:

#### a) timeframe – neolib and disposability now prove even if extinction is inevitable, it’s incredibly long term – even if they access the impact, we o/w on tf, you should prolong life

#### b) equity of lives – people who die in nuclear war are just as valuable – ethically bankrupt to make decisions otherwise – that’s Isaac – kills moral responsibility and cost benefit calculus which is a poor educational model

#### c) no root cause means they have no impacts – that’s moore – proximate cause framing to realistic approach to policymaking – they’re too general and can’t draw a causal link to any impact other than deaths of afrocuban women – that’s bad, but not as bad extinction

#### d) no impact – democracy checks – they don’t affect the ideologies of policymakers and voters – the plan would be spun as economically beneficial to the us – reentrenches neolib, BUT backing down from Syria proves we’re no longer interventionist – public conscience is going the other way – that checks

#### 1) Role conflation – ethics can’t guide public policy – we as individuals could endorse the aff but the USFG shouldn’t

**Ethics can’t guide public policy**

**Posner 99** – highly influential legal theorist; Chicago Law School professor (Richard, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, p vii-x, AG)

The book is in two parts, each containing two chapters. The first part is primarily critical, the second primarily constructive. Chapter 1 tackles normative moral theory on its own terms, arguing that people who make philosophical arguments for why we should alter our moral beliefs or behavior are wasting their time if what they want to do is to alter those beliefs and the behavior the beliefs might influence. Moral intuitions neither do nor should yield to the weak arguments that are all that philosophers can bring to bear on moral issues. I call this position "pragmatic moral skepticism." It must not be confused with philosophically more radical isms. I am not a moral nihilist, nor an epistemological skeptic or relativist, but merely a limited skeptic, as an example will show. That the Nazis killed millions of defenseless civilians is a fact; its truth is independent of what anyone believes. That the Nazis' actions were morally wrong is a value judgment: it depends on beliefs that cannot be proved true or false. I thus reject moral realism, at least in its strong sense as the doctrine that there are universal moral laws ontologically akin to scientific laws. I am a kind of moral relativist. But my metaethical views are not essential to pragmatic moral skepticism, the doctrine that moral theory is useless, although they help to explain why it is useless. The doctrine is supported by bodies of thought as various as the psychology of action, the character of academic professions in general and of the profession of academic philosophy in particular, and the undesirability of moral uniformity; and above all by the fact that the casuistic and deliberative techniques that moral theorists deploy are too feeble, both epistemologically and rhetorically, to shake moral intuitions. The analogy (of a pregnant woman forced to carry her fetus to term to a person forcibly attached by tubes to a famous violinist for nine months in order to save the violinist from dying of kidney disease) with which Judith Jarvis Thomson defends a right of abortion, and at the other end of the spectrum of abstraction the elaborate contractarian and natural-law arguments that John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, John Finnis, and others make on behalf of their preferred resolutions of issues in applied ethics, are convincing only to readers predisposed to agree with the philosophers' conclusions. The class of innovators whom I call "moral entrepreneurs" do have the power to change our moral intuitions. But moral entrepreneurs are not the same as academic moralists, such as Thomson and the others I have named. Moral entrepreneurs persuade, but not with rational arguments. Academic moralists use rational arguments; but in part because of the sheer feebleness of such arguments, they do not persuade. Chapter 2 carries the discussion explicitly into the realm of law. I examine issues in jurisprudence, constitutional law, and (to a limited extent) common law and statutory law. I try to show with reference both to individual theorists—Dworkin again, Jurgen Habermas, and others—and to particular cases that moral theory, and such cousins of it as jurisprudence and constitutional theory, are useless in the resolution of concrete legal issues. This is true even when those issues concern such morally charged subjects as abortion, affirmative action, racial and sexual discrimination, and homosexual rights. Consider the constitutionality of laws forbidding physician-assisted suicide, the issue that impelled a group of distinguished moral philosophers led by Dworkin to submit an amicus curiae brief in the Supreme Court that the Court ignored in its decisions upholding those laws. Judges are properly wary about using moral or constitutional theory to decide cases. At the same time, as I illustrate with the Supreme Court's decisions invalidating sex segregation in military academies and a state constitutional provision forbidding local governments to prohibit discrimination against homosexuals, judges are insensitive to the limitations of their own knowledge of the social realities out of which cases arise. They are right to distrust theory that academics press upon them, but they have as yet nothing to put in its place—unless it is an attitude of caution. That is the right attitude in the circumstances. Until judges acquire a better knowledge base, the limitations of moral and constitutional theory provide a compelling argument for judicial self-restraint, although to accept it would be to renounce the dream of many constitutional theorists that the Supreme Court might make over American society in the name of the Constitution but in the reality of radical egalitarianism, Catholic natural law, laissez-Faire economics, or reactionary populism, depending on the theorist. Constitutional scholars would be more helpful to the courts and to society as a whole if they examined constitutional cases and doctrines in relation not to what passes as theory in jurisprudential circles but rather to the social context of constitutional issues, their causes, their costs, and their consequences. This is a neglected perspective, which I illustrate in Chapter 2 by reference to the "real world" effects of constitutional criminal procedure.

#### 2) Existential risk outweighs

**Nuclear war causes extinction—it should come first**

**Sandberg 8**—Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. PhD in computation neuroscience, Stockholm—AND—Jason G. Matheny—PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh—AND—Milan M. Ćirković—senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. Assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad. (Anders, How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?, 9 September 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction, AMiles)

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law. Farther out in time are technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed this century. Molecular nanotechnology could allow the creation of self-replicating machines capable of destroying the ecosystem. And advances in neuroscience and computation might enable improvements in cognition that accelerate the invention of new weapons. A survey at the Oxford conference found that concerns about human extinction were dominated by fears that new technologies would be misused. These emerging threats are especially challenging as they could become dangerous more quickly than past technologies, outpacing society's ability to control them. As H.G. Wells noted, "Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe." Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction: A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, **the stakes are one million times greater for extinction** than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss--including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations. Fortunately, most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction. These measures include: Removing nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert and further reducing their numbers; Placing safeguards on gene synthesis equipment to prevent synthesis of select pathogens; Improving our ability to respond to infectious diseases, including rapid disease surveillance, diagnosis, and control, as well as accelerated drug development; Funding research on asteroid detection and deflection, "hot spot" eruptions, methane hydrate deposits, and other catastrophic natural hazards; Monitoring developments in key disruptive technologies, such as nanotechnology and computational neuroscience, and developing international policies to reduce the risk of catastrophic accidents. Other measures to reduce extinction risks may have less in common with strategies to improve global security, generally. Since a species' survivability is closely related to the extent of its range, perhaps the most effective means of reducing the risk of human extinction is to colonize space sooner, rather than later. Citing, in particular, the threat of new biological weapons, Stephen Hawking has said, "I don't think the human race will survive the next thousand years, unless we spread into space. There are too many accidents that can befall life on a single planet." Similarly, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin has noted, "The history of life on Earth is the history of extinction events, and human expansion into the Solar System is, in the end, fundamentally about the survival of the species."

#### 3) Context and consequences are key

**Nuclear war causes extinction—it should come first**

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#### 4) It’s inevitable

**Utilitarianism inevitable**

**Green 2** – Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, November 2002 "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It", 314) GZ

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as **thoroughly consequentialist** as can be, **despite** the **deontological gloss**. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

#### 5) Turn – ignoring DAs is morally bankrupt

**Ignoring disads is morally bankrupt**

**Nielsen 72** – Professor of Philosophy, Calgary (Kai, Against Moral Conservativism, Ethics 82.3, p 229-30, jstor, AG)

Anticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who will sanction such killing of the innocent, but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far greater intend the death and misery but merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to constitute a **moral evasion**. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity, he allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to keep his 'moral purity' and avoid 'dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard called 'double-mindedness.' It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this does not make it right.

#### The aff makes it an intended consequence

Cameron, Prof of Philosophy, 89 **–** Prof Philosophy, Aberdeen (Robin, Ethics and Environmental Responsibility, p 60)

Where our actions may by their consequences affect others, the responsibility which falls upon us on account of these possible effects relates to the foreseeable consequences of our actions. We are not responsible for the actual consequences, if we could not have foreseen these consequences. Nor on the other hand is it simply the consequences we intended that matter: we cannot defend our actions by pointing to the good consequences we intended. Rather, we are responsible to the extent that we could have foreseen certain consequences as bound to, or liable to, flow from

### 2NC – AT: FW

#### Only usfg perspective matters and it excludes the aff’s fw

Kennan 86 — George F. Kennan, Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University, served as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1952) and Yugoslavia (1961-1963), 1985 (“Morality and Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1985/1986, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 216)

Second, let us recognize that the functions, commitments and moral obligations of governments are not the same as those [end page 205] of the individual. Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience. No more than the attorney vis-a-vis the client, nor the doctor vis-a-vis the patient, can government attempt to insert itself into the consciences of those whose interests it represents. Let me explain. The interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality. They arise from the very existence of the national state in question and from the status of national sovereignty it enjoys. They are the unavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either "good" or "bad." They may be questioned from a detached philosophic point of view. But the government of the sovereign state cannot make such judgments. When it accepts the responsibilities of governing, implicit in that acceptance is the assumption that it is right that the state should be sovereign, that the integrity of its political life should be assured, that its people should enjoy the blessings of military security, material prosperity and a reasonable opportunity for, as the Declaration of Independence puts it, the pursuit of happiness. For these assumptions the government needs no moral justification, nor need it accept any moral reproach for acting on the basis of them.

### 2NC – Framing

**Violence declining**

**Horgan, ’09** (John, science journalist and Director of the Center for Science Writings at the Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New Jersey. A former senior writer at Scientific American (1986-1997), former writer for The New York Times, Time, Newsweek, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The New Republic, Slate, Discover, The London Times, The Times Literary Supplement, New Scientist, and other publications around the world. He writes the "Cross-check" blog for Scientific American, does video chats for Bloggingheads.tv and writes a column for BBC Knowledge Magazine, “Winning the Battle: How Humans Could End War”, jkim)

"Violence has been in decline over long stretches of history," agrees psychologist Steven Pinker of Harvard University. Homicide rates in modern Europe, for example, are more than 10 times lower than they were in the Middle Ages. Decreases in the rate of warfare and homicide, Pinker notes, cannot be explained by changes in human nature over such a relatively short period. Cultural changes and changes in attitude must be responsible, he says.

Pinker gives several reasons for the modern decline of violence in general. First, the creation of stable nations with effective legal systems and police forces. Second, increased life expectancies that make us less willing to risk our lives through violence. Third, increasing globalisation and improvements in communications technology, which have increased our interdependence with, and empathy towards, those outside of our immediate "tribes". "The forces of modernity are making things better and better," he says.

#### The world is getting systematically better – disproves the causality of your K

**Pinker 07** (Steven, Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology – Harvard University, “A History of Violence”, Edge: The Third Culture, 3-28, http://www.edge.org/3rd\_culture/pinker07/pinker07\_index.html, CAT)

In sixteenth-century Paris, a popular form of entertainment was cat-burning, in which a cat was hoisted in a sling on a stage and slowly lowered into a fire. According to historian Norman Davies, "[T]he spectators, including kings and queens, shrieked with laughter as the animals, howling with pain, were singed, roasted, and finally carbonized." Today, such sadism would be unthinkable in most of the world. This change in sensibilities is just one example of perhaps the most important and most underappreciated trend in the human saga: Violence has been in decline over long stretches of history, and today we are probably living in **the most peaceful moment** of our species' time on earth. In the decade of Darfur and Iraq, and shortly after the century of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, the claim that violence has been diminishing may seem somewhere between hallucinatory and obscene. Yet recent studies that seek to quantify the historical ebb and flow of violence point to exactly that conclusion. Some of the evidence has been under our nose all along. Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, we have been getting kinder and gentler. Cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, conquest as the mission statement of government, genocide as a means of acquiring real estate, torture and mutilation as routine punishment, the death penalty for misdemeanors and differences of opinion, assassination as the mechanism of political succession, rape as the spoils of war, pogroms as outlets for frustration, homicide as the major form of conflict resolution—all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But, today, they are rare to nonexistent in the West, far less common elsewhere than they used to be, concealed when they do occur, and widely condemned when they are brought to light. At one time, these facts were widely appreciated. They were the source of notions like progress, civilization, and man's rise from savagery and barbarism. Recently, however, those ideas have come to sound corny, even dangerous. They seem to demonize people in other times and places, license colonial conquest and other foreign adventures, and conceal the crimes of our own societies. The doctrine of the noble savage—the idea that humans are peaceable by nature and corrupted by modern institutions—pops up frequently in the writing of public intellectuals like José Ortega y Gasset ("War is not an instinct but an invention"), Stephen Jay Gould ("Homo sapiens is not an evil or destructive species"), and Ashley Montagu ("Biological studies lend support to the ethic of universal brotherhood"). But, now that social scientists have started to count bodies in different historical periods, they have discovered that the romantic theory gets it backward: **Far from causing us to become more violent**, something in modernity and its cultural institutions has made us nobler. To be sure, any attempt to document changes in violence must be soaked in uncertainty. In much of the world, the distant past was a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it, and, even for events in the historical record, statistics are spotty until recent periods. Long-term trends can be discerned only by smoothing out zigzags and spikes of horrific bloodletting. And the choice to focus on relative rather than absolute numbers brings up the moral imponderable of whether it is worse for 50 percent of a population of 100 to be killed or 1 percent in a population of one billion. Yet, despite these caveats, a picture is taking shape. The decline of violence is a fractal phenomenon, visible at the scale of millennia, centuries, decades, and years. It applies over several orders of magnitude of violence, from genocide to war to rioting to homicide to the treatment of children and animals. And **it appears to be a worldwide trend**, though not a homogeneous one. The leading edge has been in Western societies, especially England and Holland, and there seems to have been a tipping point at the onset of the Age of Reason in the early seventeenth century. At the widest-angle view, one can see a whopping difference across the millennia that separate us from our pre-state ancestors. Contra leftist anthropologists who celebrate the noble savage, quantitative body-counts—such as the proportion of prehistoric skeletons with axemarks and embedded arrowheads or the proportion of men in a contemporary foraging tribe who die at the hands of other men—suggest that pre-state societies were far more violent than our own. It is true that raids and battles killed a tiny percentage of the numbers that die in modern warfare. But, in tribal violence, the clashes are more frequent, the percentage of men in the population who fight is greater, and the rates of death per battle are higher. According to anthropologists like Lawrence Keeley, Stephen LeBlanc, Phillip Walker, and Bruce Knauft, these factors combine to yield population-wide rates of death in tribal warfare that dwarf those of modern times. If the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not 100 million. Political correctness from the other end of the ideological spectrum has also distorted many people's conception of violence in early civilizations—namely, those featured in the Bible. This supposed source of moral values contains many celebrations of genocide, in which the Hebrews, egged on by God, slaughter every last resident of an invaded city. The Bible also prescribes death by stoning as the penalty for a long list of nonviolent infractions, including idolatry, blasphemy, homosexuality, adultery, disrespecting one's parents, and picking up sticks on the Sabbath. The Hebrews, of course, were no more murderous than other tribes; one also finds frequent boasts of torture and genocide in the early histories of the Hindus, Christians, Muslims, and Chinese. At the century scale, it is hard to find quantitative studies of deaths in warfare spanning medieval and modern times. Several historians have suggested that there has been an increase in the number of recorded wars across the centuries to the present, but, as political scientist James Payne has noted, this may show only that "the Associated Press is a more comprehensive source of information about battles around the world than were sixteenth-century monks." Social histories of the West provide evidence of numerous barbaric practices that became obsolete in the last five centuries, such as slavery, amputation, blinding, branding, flaying, disembowelment, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, and so on. Meanwhile, for another kind of violence—homicide—the data are abundant and striking. The criminologist Manuel Eisner has assembled hundreds of homicide estimates from Western European localities that kept records at some point between 1200 and the mid-1990s. In every country he analyzed, murder rates declined steeply—for example, from 24 homicides per 100,000 Englishmen in the fourteenth century to 0.6 per 100,000 by the early 1960s. On the scale of decades, comprehensive data again paint a shockingly happy picture: Global violence has fallen steadily since the middle of the twentieth century. According to the Human Security Brief 2006, the number of battle deaths in interstate wars has declined from more than 65,000 per year in the 1950s to less than 2,000 per year in this decade. In Western Europe and the Americas, the second half of the century saw a steep decline in the number of wars, military coups, and deadly ethnic riots. Zooming in by a further power of ten exposes yet another reduction. After the cold war, every part of the world saw a **steep drop-off in state-based conflicts**, and those that do occur are more likely to end in negotiated settlements rather than being fought to the bitter end. Meanwhile, according to political scientist Barbara Harff, between 1989 and 2005 the number of campaigns of mass killing of civilians decreased by 90 percent.

### 2NC – Neolib inev

#### Alt doesn’t solve

**Springer 9** – Prof @ University of Otago (2009, Simon Springer, Prof @ University of Otago, “Postneoliberalism? Or What Geography Still Ought To Be,” ngoetz)

Given the relationship between neoliberalism and crises, moments of crisis do not prefigure an impending collapse of the neoliberal project. Instead, crises actually represent a continuation that offers a window on the character of neoliberalism as an adaptive regime of socioeconomic governance (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner forthcoming). So to the question ‘does this crisis signal the end of neoliberalism?’, David Harvey (2009: np) appropriately responds by suggesting, “it depends what you mean by neo-liberalism. My interpretation is that it’s a class project, masked by a lot of neo-liberal rhetoric about individual freedom, liberty, personal responsibility, privatization and the free market. These were means, however, towards the restoration and consolidation of class power, and that neo-liberal project has been fairly successful”. The corporate bailouts thus are not necessarily reflective of a terminal moment for neoliberalism, but instead represent a continuation of the class project, reconfigured under a modus operendi that explicitly returns its accumulative practices to the basis of taxation.

### AT: Giroux

#### Giroux’s account of oppression doesn’t apply to debate – he overdetermines the cooptation of pedagogical practices

Benjamin **Franks 7**, Lecturer in Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, “Who Are You to tell me to Question Authority?”, Variant issue 29, <http://www.variant.org.uk/29texts/Franks29.html>

Potentially stronger criticisms of Giroux’s text lie precisely in his underlying hypothesis concerning the totalising power of neo-conservatism. Giroux shares with the members of the Frankfurt School, who he approvingly cites, a pessimistic and almost wholly determined account of future social developments, in which the prognosis for alternatives to dominant powers looks bleak. Giroux, like Adorno and Marcuse, fears that we are approaching a one-dimensional future composed of intellectually stunted individuals, who are manipulated by the cultural industries, endorse militarised social hierarchies and engage in relationships conceived of only in terms of market-values. This grim dystopia is subject to continual monitoring by an evermore technologically-equipped police and legitimised by an increasingly subservient, partisan and trivial media. However, whilst Giroux’s account of growing authoritarianism is convincingly expressed, it is potentially disempowering, as it would suggest little space for opposition. It is not simply wishful thinking to suggest that the existing power structures are neither as complete nor as impervious as Giroux’s account would suggest. Whilst the old media of radio, film and television are increasingly dominated by a few giant corporations (p.46), new technologies have opened access to dissident voices and created new forms of communication and organisation. Whilst the military are extending their reach into greater areas of social and political life, and intervening in greater force throughout the globe, resistance to military discipline is also arising, with fewer willing to join the army in both the US and UK.7 Bush’s long term military objectives look increasingly unfeasible as Peter Schoomaker, the former US Chief of Staff, told Congress on December 15, 2006 that even the existing deployment policy is looking increasingly ‘untenable’.8 The ‘overstretch’ of military resources is matched by an economy incapable of fulfilling its primary neo-conservative goals of low taxation, sound national finances and extensive military interventions. Whilst this is not to suggest that the US is on the point of financial implosion, the transition to a fully proto-fascist state is unlikely to be seamless or certain. Giroux’s preferred form of resistance is radical education. The photographs from Abu Ghraib were iconic not just in their encapsulation of proto-fascism, but in their public pedagogic role. Their prominence highlighted the many different sites of interpretation, as Giroux rightly stresses, there is no single way to interpret a photograph, however potent the depiction. The ability to interpret an image requires an ongoing process by a critical citizenry capable of identifying the methods by which a picture’s meanings are constructed (p. 135). Giroux’s critical pedagogy overtly borrows from Adorno’s essay ‘Education After Auschwitz’, and proposes “modes of education that produce critical, engaging and free minds” (p. 141). But herein lies one of the flaws with the text: Giroux never spells out what sorts of existing institutions and social practices are practical models of this critical pedagogy. Thus, he does not indicate what methods he finds appropriate in resisting the proto-fascist onslaught nor how merely interpreting images critically would fundamentally contest hierarchical power-relationships. Questions arise as to the adequacy of his response to the totalising threat he identifies in the main section of the book. Clearly existing academic institutions in the US are barely adequate given the campaigns against dissident academics led by David Horowitz (p.143). Giroux recounts in the final chapter, an interview conducted by Sina Rahmani, his own flight from the prestigious Penn State University to McMaster University in Canada because of managerial harassment following his public criticisms of Penn’s involvement in military research (p. 186). But whilst Giroux recognises that education is far wider than what takes place in institutions of learning there is no account of what practical forms these take. Nor does Giroux give an account of why a critical pedagogy would take priority over informed aesthetic or ethical practices. Such a concentration on education would appear to prioritise those who already have (by virtue of luck or social circumstance) an already existing expertise in critical thinking, risking an oppressive power-relationship in which the expert drills the student into rigorous assessment. This lapse into the role of the strident instructor demanding the correct form of radical response, occasionally appears in Giroux’s text: “within the boundaries of critical education, students have to learn the skills and knowledge to narrate their own stories [and] resist the fragmentation and seductions of market ideologies” (p. 155). Woe betide the student who prefers to narrate the story of the person sitting next to them, or fails to measure up to the ‘educators’ standard of critical evaluation.

## Grapevine – 1NR – Rd. 1

**Western imperialism is good and solves extinction**

**Outweighs and turns the case**

**– progress in amercan leadership resulted in a better framework for society increase in freedom wealth health comfort life expentance, reason, rights, tech, famine, poverty, illiness, equality, dictatorship-these values must be defended as our lives depend on them – that’s locke and moore**

**The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and good—it’s essential to global stability and cooperation.**

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wolforth 13** (STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, “Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, ZBurdette)

Since the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a single grand strategy: deep engagement. In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a liberal economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Its military bases cover the map, its ships patrol transit routes across the globe, and tens of thousands of its troops stand guard in allied countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea.

The details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from administration to administration, including the emphasis placed on democracy promotion and humanitarian goals, but for over 60 years, every president has agreed on the fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged in the world, even as the rationale for that strategy has shifted. During the Cold War, the United States' security commitments to Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East served primarily to prevent Soviet encroachment into the world's wealthiest and most resource-rich regions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the aim has become to make these same regions more secure, and thus less threatening to the United States, and to use these security partnerships to foster the cooperation necessary for a stable and open international order.

Now, more than ever, Washington might be tempted to abandon this grand strategy and pull back from the world. The rise of China is chipping away at the United States' preponderance of power, a budget crisis has put defense spending on the chopping block, and two long wars have left the U.S. military and public exhausted. Indeed, even as most politicians continue to assert their commitment to global leadership, a very different view has taken hold among scholars of international relations over the past decade: that the United States should minimize its overseas military presence, shed its security ties, and give up its efforts to lead the liberal international order.

Proponents of retrenchment argue that a globally engaged grand strategy wastes money by subsidizing the defense of well-off allies and generates resentment among foreign populations and governments. A more modest posture, they contend, would put an end to allies' free-riding and defuse anti-American sentiment. Even if allies did not take over every mission the United States now performs, most of these roles have nothing to do with U.S. security and only risk entrapping the United States in unnecessary wars. In short, those in this camp maintain that pulling back would not only save blood and treasure but also make the United States more secure.

They are wrong. In making their case, advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs of the current grand strategy and understate its benefits. In fact, the budgetary savings of lowering the United States' international profile are debatable, and there is little evidence to suggest that an internationally engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars.

The benefits of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats. Were the United States to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential.

AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY

Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement -- numbers that are hard to pin down.

If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad.

The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies.

Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs.

UNBALANCED

One such alleged cost of the current grand strategy is that, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, it "prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can." Yet there is no evidence that countries have banded together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the United States' military capacity on their own -- or that they will do so in the future.

Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it faces no contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point.

If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback -- especially during the administration of George W. Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the United States by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting. Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the United States benefits from employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms.

Another argument for retrenchment holds that the United States will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive purposes -- infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on -- that are necessary to keep its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they otherwise would.

The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them -- a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use their position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies by economists find no clear relationship between military expenditures and economic decline.

To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around a quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense -- a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy.

Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels -- just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance.

LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION

The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human lives, and critics of an expansive grand strategy worry that the United States might get dragged into unnecessary wars. Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower sponsor into costly conflicts -- a classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the country's alliance commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake.

History shows, however, that great powers anticipate the danger of entrapment and structure their agreements to protect themselves from it. It is nearly impossible to find a clear case of a smaller power luring a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World War I served as the canonical example of entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a fight, but an outpouring of new historical research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of a conscious decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance entrapment.

If anything, alliances reduce the risk of getting pulled into a conflict. In East Asia, the regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor Cha, to "constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war." The same logic is now at play in the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship. After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S. officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support for Taiwan might expose them to the risk of entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence.

For many advocates of retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem begins to look like America's to solve. Critics also argue that the country's military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to security problems, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed such awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial fixes, such as containment, and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes.

Furthermore, they contend, the United States' outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake. As Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the un, famously asked Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?"

If the U.S. military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to intervene would not disappear. The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations.

Besides, the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the United States' existing grand strategy; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly opposed the war. Likewise, continuing the current grand strategy in no way condemns the United States to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations -- what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing.

KEEPING THE PEACE

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states.

Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier.

But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington -- notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia -- might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas.

There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers.

Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East -- but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow.

Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up.

The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world's key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as a percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals is by many measures growing.

On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony -- China -- and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing.

MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE

Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open.

A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred -- convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship."

More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States.

The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU's dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk.

CREATING COOPERATION

What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability.

U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others.

The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region.

The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."

THE DEVIL WE KNOW

Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes -- a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits.

This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world.

A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

Lbl

Jsutifiction of coercive democratization

no- **Hegemony underlies all the self-reinforcing systems that correlate with inter-state peace-its not coercive its interdependnce**

**Owen, Ph.D. in IR from Harvard, 11**—associate professor in the University of Virginia’s Department of Politics, Ph.D. in international relations from Harvard (John, 2/11/11, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/>, RBatra)

Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological.

Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A.

But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another.

Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now.

Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries).

These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? **How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time**, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars.

Exeptionalism

Is good-overview

Cultural erasure

**Tursn the case - Criticizing Western “imperialism” obscures more insidious practices by regional powers**

**Shaw 2 –** Sussex IR Professor (Martin, The Problem of the Quasi-Imperial State, www.martinshaw.org/empire.htm)

Nor have many considered the possibility that if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today, it applies to certain aggressive, authoritarian regimes of the non-Western world rather than to the contemporary West. In this paper I fully accept that there is a concentration of much world power - economic, cultural, political and military - in the hands of Western elites. In my recent book, Theory of the Global State, I discuss the development of a 'global-Western state conglomerate' (Shaw 2000). I argue that 'global' ideas and institutions, whose significance characterizes the new political era that has opened with the end of the Cold War, depend largely - but not solely - on Western power. I hold no brief and intend no apology for official Western ideas and behaviour. And yet I propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly misleading, indeed ideological concept that obscures the realities of power and especially of empire in the twenty-first century. This notion is an obstacle to understanding the significance, extent and limits of contemporary Western power. It simultaneously serves to obscure many real causes of oppression, suffering and struggle for transformation against the quasi-imperial power of many regional states. I argue that in the global era, this separation has finally become critical. This is for two related reasons. On the one hand, Western power has moved into new territory, largely uncharted -- and I argue unchartable -- with the critical tools of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the politics of empire remain all too real, in classic forms that recall both modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non-Western states, and they are revived in many political struggles today. Thus the concept of a 'new imperialism' fails to deal with both key post-imperial features of Western power and the quasi-imperial character of many non-Western states. The concept overstates Western power and understates the dangers posed by other, more authoritarian and imperial centres of power. Politically it identifies the West as the principal enemy of the world's people, when for many of them there are far more real and dangerous enemies closer to.

You should prefer a fw of emperics – that has the greatest and clearest implications of truth as it cites history - a repletion of events that already happened

**We control empirics**

**Wohlforth** **8**—Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale (William, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, October 2008, World Politics Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 28, 31 pgs, Proquest, AMiles)

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet empirical studies of the relationship between both systemic and dyadic capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul of well-established patterns or general historical findings, then there is little reason to continue investigating them. **The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems**. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then, ceteris paribus, unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes in a review of the empirical literature: "**The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity**."39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was an unusually stratified unipolar structure, with an economic and militarily dominant China interacting with a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian states.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

**Prefer empirics**

**Rodwell 5**—PhD candidate, Manchester Met. (Jonathan, Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson, http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm, AMiles)

The larger problem is that without clear causal links between materially identifiable events and factors any assessment within the argument actually becomes **nonsensical**. Mirroring the early inability to criticise, if we have no traditional causational discussion how can we know what is happening? For example, Jackson details how the rhetoric of anti-terrorism and fear is obfuscating the real problems. It is proposed that the real world killers are not terrorism, but disease or illegal drugs or environmental issues. The problem is how do we know this? It seems we know this because there is evidence that illustrates as much – Jackson himself quoting to Dr David King who argued global warming is a greater that than terrorism. The only problem of course is that discourse analysis has established (as argued by Jackson) that King’s argument would just be self-contained discourse designed to naturalise another arguments for his own reasons. Ultimately it would be no more valid than the argument that excessive consumption of Sugar Puffs is the real global threat. It is worth repeating that I don’t personally believe global terrorism is the world’s primary threat, nor do I believe that Sugar Puffs are a global killer. But without the ability to identify real facts about the world we can simply say anything, or we can say nothing. This is clearly ridiculous and many post-structuralists can see this. Their argument is that there “are empirically more persuasive explanations.”[xi] The phrase ‘empirically persuasive’ is however the final undermining of post-structural discourse analysis. It is a seemingly fairly obvious reintroduction of traditional methodology and causal links. It implies things that can be seen to be right regardless of perspective or discourse. It again goes without saying that logically in this case if such an assessment is possible then undeniable material factors about the word are real and are knowable outside of any cultural definition. Language or culture then does not wholy constitute reality. How do we know in the end that the world not threatened by the onslaught of an oppressive and dangerous breakfast cereal? Because empirically persuasive evidence tells us this is the case. The question must then be asked, is our understanding of the world born of evidential assessment, or born of discourse analysis? Or perhaps it’s actually born of utilisation of many different possible explanations.

We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically **American hegemony**.

A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—**one powerful country must take the lead**. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant.

There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just **be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world.**

How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history.

The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. **American power and policies may be responsible for these** in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth.

Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

**Most recent evidence proves violence is declining due to American values**

**Pinker 11**—Steven Pinker is the Harvard College Professor of Psychology at Harvard University (9/24/11, “Violence Vanquished”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories>, nkj)

On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence. Somewhere in the world there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?"

But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?"

Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species.

The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children.

This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood.

Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals.

Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence.

The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago.

For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control.

These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history.

It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves.

The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide.

The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back.

Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors.

The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery.

The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace.

Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population).

Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars.

The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers.

The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, **organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression** by autocratic governments, **terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world**, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously.

The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%.

The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end.

Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and girlfriends.

In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people.

\* \* \* \*

Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature?

This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment.

It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels.

The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels.

We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice.

Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism.

For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money.

A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them.

These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.

Whatever its causes, the implications of the historical decline of violence are profound. So much depends on whether we see our era as a nightmare of crime, terrorism, genocide and war or as a period that, in the light of the historical and statistical facts, is blessed by unprecedented levels of peaceful coexistence.

Bearers of good news are often advised to keep their mouths shut, lest they lull people into complacency. But this prescription may be backward. The discovery that fewer people are victims of violence can thwart cynicism among compassion-fatigued news readers who might otherwise think that the dangerous parts of the world are irredeemable hell holes. And a better understanding of what drove the numbers down can steer us toward doing things that make people better off rather than congratulating ourselves on how moral we are.

As one becomes aware of the historical decline of violence, the world begins to look different. The past seems less innocent, the present less sinister. One starts to appreciate the small gifts of coexistence that would have seemed utopian to our ancestors: the interracial family playing in the park, the comedian who lands a zinger on the commander in chief, the countries that quietly back away from a crisis instead of escalating to war.

For all the tribulations in our lives, for all the troubles that remain in the world, the decline of violence is an accomplishment that we can savor—and an impetus to cherish the forces of civilization and enlightenment that made it possible.

**Other states won’t follow your transition—they will just exploit US weakness**

**Murray 97**, - Professor Politics at the University of Wales, 1997 (Alastair Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 181-2)

This highlights the central difficulty with Wendt's constructivism. It is not any form of unfounded idealism about the possibility of effecting a change in international politics. Wendt accepts that the intersubjective character of international institutions such as self-help render them relatively hard social facts. Rather, What is problematic is his faith that such chance, if it could be achieved, implies progress. Wendt's entire approach is governed by the belief that the problematic elements of international politics can be transcended, that the competitive identities which create these elements can be reconditioned, and that the predatory policies which underlie these identities can be eliminated. Everything in his account, is up for gabs: there is no core of recalcitrance to human conduct which cannot be reformed, unlearnt, disposed of. This venerates a stance that so privileges the possibility of a systemic transformation that it simply puts aside the difficulties which it recognises to be inherent in its achievement. Thus, even though Wendt acknowledges that the intersubjective basis of the self-help system makes its reform difficult, this does not dissuade him. He simply demands that states adopt a strategy of 'altercasting', a strategy which 'tries to induce alter to take on a new identity (and thereby enlist alter in ego's effort to change itself) by treating alter as if it already had that identity'. Wendt's position effectively culminates in a demand that the state undertake nothing less than a giant **leap of faith**. The fact that its opponent might not take its overtures seriously. might not be interested in reformulating its own construction of the world. **or might** simply **see such an opening as a weakness to be exploited.** are completely discounted. The prospect of achieving a systemic transformation simply outweighs any adverse consequences which might arise from the effort to achieve it. Wendt ultimately appears, in the final analysis, to have overdosed on 'Gorbimania'.

**Infinite number of ‘root causes’ means only deterrence solves**

**Moore 4** Walter L. Brown Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law (John Norton Moore**, “**Solving the War Puzzle: beyond the democratic peace,” pg 41-43)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of many traditional “causes” of war? Past and many contemporary, theories of war and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of “honor”, or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that are the key to most effectively controlling war….Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.

**You should discard non-empirical theories of war**

**Moore 4** – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia (7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, page xxii-xxvi

The "cause" of the "democratic peace" is likely not any single factor. Rather it is a combination of factors inherent in differences between the culture of democracy and the culture of Hegelian "statism." These factors probably include: differential incentive structures for regime elites, and particularly the greater ability of such elites in statist systems to externalize costs on others while internalizing the benefits of their actions; differences in leaders assuming power through public appeal versus violence; differences between ideologies of human freedom versus statist ideologies, including pervasive differences concerning the rule of law, modalities for resolution of disputes, and deification of those in power; individual empowerment versus the collective, and many other important differences in subjectivities; higher levels of external trade and international interaction between democracies; greater internal checks and balances on the decision for war; resulting greater democratic nation wealth, which may predispose to greater caution in efforts at risky expansion of values; and many other pervasive differences in culture. Of these, "incentive theory" would suggest that one particularly important factor is likely to be the first on the list; that is, the differential effect on incentives for decision elites from all of these factors together; • Contrary to entrenched conventional wisdom within the social science community, democracies are considerably less likely to initiate aggressive war than nondemocracies. Further, the differences in total casualties between democratic and nondemocratic initiated aggression is overwhelming—on the order of one to a hundred; • Nondemocracies are frequently getting into major war through aggression. A principal path to war for democracies, and an additional path to war for nondemocracies, is an absence of effective deterrence; • An absence of effective deterrence, that is, of effective incentives from the international system, is a crucial factor in major war; • For this latter reason, deterrence, rather than simply levels of power, is a more important variable than power in the origin of major war. A common absence of effective deterrence results from a failure to communicate an intent to deter, whatever the specific reason for this failure; • The democracy/deterrence syndrome is an important recurrent feature in major war; • Because of the importance of deterrence in war avoidance, theory will benefit from a more objective scoring system for measuring levels of deterrence, as we now enjoy with several systems for the scoring of democracy. This book uses an initial effort at such a scoring system developed within the author's War & Peace Seminar; • The practice of deterrence should incorporate behavioral insights from cognitive psychology, particularly including "prospect theory." Other such behavioral insights should be incorporated into broader theory as relevance is demonstrated; • Incentive theory suggests a focus of deterrence on regime decision makers (that is, reducing their incentives for war), and this feature of incentive theory is already making its way into practice; • Original studies are referenced showing correlations between form of government and terrorism, state involvement in the drug trade, refugee flows, and corruption. These supplement important studies by others showing the correlation between democracy and war, democide, economic development, famine, infant mortality, and environmental protection; • Incentive theory likely is useful in analyzing civil war, terrorism, and minor coercion, as well as major war. Specific key variables and resulting incentives, however, may be different in these settings. For example, civil war does not lend itself readily to an analysis as to which party is an aggressor under international law; • Incentive theory suggests that a crucial role in strengthening collective security is to begin to think about enhancing the role of the United Nations and other collective security mechanisms in deterrence terms; that is, thinking about mechanisms to provide advance deterrence against aggression and democide rather than leaving such action to possible collective action after the event; • Stable trade not only serves to enhance economic development, it also serves to create incentives militating against major war. The effort to remove trade barriers should continue while retaining our sensitivity to labor and the environment; • Effective foreign policy should seek both a long-run strategy of democracy enlargement and a strategy of providing effective deterrence against rogue regimes as needed to deter war, democide, and terrorism; • Democratic nations should work together to strengthen pro- democracy initiatives, such as the "Community of Democracies"; • The United States might want to create a new position of Special Representative of the President for Democracy Assistance; and • The United States might want to add a more focused "warning-response" mechanism to the National Security Council charged with the specific responsibility of formulating and presenting to the President proposals for war avoidance in war crisis settings when alerted to such crises from the intelligence community. It should be clearly understood that the demonstration of correlation does not necessarily prove causation. As such, while this book seeks to integrate the best of the empirical work with the best of the theoretical work, it presents, and can only present, an hypothesis. We should, however, certainly discard theories that are not consistent with the available empirical evidence about war. Similarly, even if "incentive theory" proves a more useful focus in seeking to predict and control war, it does not offer a slot-machine for simple answers. The decision for war is affected by a complex aggregate of incentives. Even rejecting poorer modes of focus will not provide instant answers in specific cases any more than understanding that night air does not cause plague will by itself lead to a discovery of penicillin. Until we set aside pervasive myths about war and focus our attention on the critical variables, we will have little chance to control this age-old scourge of mankind. It is hoped that this book may make an at least modest contribution to its goal.

**We control studies**

**Drezner, IR prof, 5**—Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts U, BA from Williams, MA in Economics, PhD in Political Science from Stanford U (Daniel W., 25 May 2005, Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation, http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html, RBatra)

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become **the lowest in human history.**

Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers:

The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were **less than half as many wars** in 2004 as there were in 1991.

Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the **extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half** what it was 15 years ago.

Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations.

Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out.

First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.]

Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago:

We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail.

The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the+ spread of democracy are right out the window.

UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters:

1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot ofthem. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.

**Our theory accurately accounts for all wars in the last 100 years**

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Running the hypothesis for the principal wars of the twentieth century does seem to provide support. While until recently the origins of World War I were more actively debated, there seems increasing support for the proposition, deeply believed by President Woodrow Wilson and enshrined in the Versailles Treaty, that nondemocratic [\*396] Germany and Austria were the aggressors. 162 The key is understanding that the war really began on the Eastern Front with an aggressive Austrian attack against Serbia, enthusiastically encouraged by Germany. That aggression in turn precipitated a cascade of Russian mobilization and Germany's declaration of war against France, Russia, Luxembourg, and Belgium. Even after the attack on Serbia, France ordered its troops to pull back from the border with Germany. And democratic Italy, a formal ally of the Central Powers, declared that it was only committed to a war of defense and accordingly pulled out of the coalition and instead joined the Entente Powers. Contrary to the oft-repeated arguments about World War I being caused by a tightening of competing alliances, there was no real alliance with Britain, except at a low level in military to military planning, and the British would not even tell the French that they would assist them in the event of German invasion because it might leak to the Germans! Much less did they seek to communicate such a pledge to Kaiser Wilhelm II. Indeed, we know that even late in the crises, both the Kaiser and Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow believed that Britain would remain neutral. In turn, the lack of British willingness to publicly join forces with France in deterring Germany reflected a split within the Liberal leadership. The prime minister, H. H. Asquith, confided to his girlfriend: "I suppose a good 3/4 of our own party in the House of Commons are for absolute non-interference at any price." 163 And as to the initial attack on Serbia, the Kaiser felt the risks of Russian intervention were low since he believed Russia was in no way prepared for war. This understanding of the aggressive intentions of Germany's leaders in World War I, even if they did not seek the kind of world war that resulted, is now widely accepted in Germany, as reflected, for example, in the work of the [\*397] German historian Fritz Fischer. 164 Paradoxically, some in the United States, France, and Britain seem to have accepted the arguments to the contrary poured out by the special section of the German Foreign Office set up after the war to challenge the imputation of German war guilt. 165 World War II is, on the Western Front, a poster child for the paradigm. 166 The paradigm also meets the origins of the war in the Pacific theater as well, where the government of Tojo intentionally set out on an aggressive "Southern Strategy" following Japan's aggression against China and growing resource concerns from the resulting sanctions. No doubt deterrence, which might have been expected from Britain, France, and the Netherlands in the area of Japanese expansion, was substantially reduced by the then perceived defeat of all three powers by Hitler. 167 The United States seemed the only real obstacle to the proposed hegemony, and many factors suggested to Japanese leaders that the United States could be effectively removed by a major strategic blow against the fleet concentrated at Pearl Harbor. 168 Whatever the debate about the comparative roles of Stalin and Kim Il Sung in the Korean invasion, it is clear that there was almost no deterrence before the attack. U.S. military forces, except for a 500-man training team, were withdrawn from South Korea in 1949. Congress had refused to adequately arm the government of South Korea as requested by our ambassador and military command in Korea, and both Secretary [\*398] of State Dean Acheson and General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Allied Commander Far East, had made public statements implying that Korea was beyond the United States defense perimeter. 169 Indeed, these statements were consistent with the views of the Joint Chiefs in the prevailing climate of limited military resources and focus on the Soviet threat in Europe. Kim Il Sung is said to have sought to persuade Stalin that the United States would not intervene because the attack would be a decisive surprise attack lasting only a few days or weeks. And the overall strategic equation had just been drastically changed by the 1949 Soviet explosion of their first atomic weapon and the Communist takeover of China. 170 Moreover, if the United States had not fought to prevent a Communist takeover of China, why would it do so in Korea? The Vietnam morass cannot be quickly summarized, but it should be noted that the defeat of South Vietnam came about only after the Paris Accords had produced a Nobel Peace Prize for both sides and that, following the American force withdrawal, congressional abandonment of Vietnam, and collapse of the presidency in Watergate, a totalitarian North launched a twenty-two division Korean style regular army invasion of the South. The absence of deterrence was so complete that North Vietnam kept back only its anti-coup division around Hanoi. And the lack of American will for reengagement was so total that President Ford was not even able to get both houses of Congress to agree on a simple authorization to use U.S. forces for the orderly evacuation of Americans from Saigon. 171 The Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War also closely fit the hypothesis. In both, an aggressive Saddam Hussein, sensing an absence of effective deterrence, initiated an attack. The collapse in Iranian deterrence, which lured Hussein in the war against Iran, was a product of the domestic turmoil following the fall of the Shah. Kuwait simply seemed an easy target after the bitter experience in the war with Iran. And, while there could have been signals from the United States or Britain to give Saddam pause before the invasion of Kuwait, no such signals [\*399] materialized. 172 As the dramatic reduction in deterrence accompanying the Iranian revolution illustrates, it is possible that the apparently greater risk of war for nations undergoing a transition to democracy, postulated by Professors Mansfield and Snyder in their 1995 Foreign Affairs article "Democratization and War," may result, at least in part, from the dramatic reduction in levels of deterrence in many such settings. 173 Prior to the ongoing revolution in the former Soviet Union, for example, levels of deterrence from centralized state power made a serious Chechnya insurrection unlikely. Conversely, the Gulf War illustrates yet another example of how effective deterrence may have worked to prevent Saddam Hussein from using chemical weapons against the coalition to liberate Kuwait, despite his earlier use of such weapons against Iran and even his own people. George Bush and Margaret Thatcher clearly warned Hussein that the coalition would not tolerate the use of weapons of mass destruction. In a letter to Hussein, Bush said, "You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort." 174 A UN Special Commission on Iraq later found copies of this Bush letter all over the country. And a 1994 European Union Assembly report found that the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. aircraft carriers in the Gulf may well have deterred Iraq. The failure of the second phase of the UN operation in Somalia and subsequent failed UN efforts in Rwanda also reflect an absence of effective deterrence against aggressive nondemocratic regimes. The first phase of the Somalia operation, undertaken by President George Bush at [\*400] the urging of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, may have saved as many as a million Somalis from starvation as feuding clan leaders sought to use starvation as a weapon in their political struggles. Following withdrawal of the bulk of U.S. forces, however, Mohamed Farrah Aidid and his Habr Gidr clan began attacking UN forces in a bid to take control rather than participate in a UN brokered coalition government. On June 24, 1993, twenty-four Pakistani UN peacekeepers were killed, apparently by Aidid's forces. These attacks occurred in a setting of substantially reduced deterrence. Understandably, UN leadership, supported by the United States, sought to hold Aidid responsible and to move forward with the mission. Subsequently, after the United States led a special operation in Mogadishu against Aidid's forces that resulted in two MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters shot down and eighteen U.S. soldiers dead, President Bill Clinton ended the effort to control Aidid, rather than commit the forces necessary to decisively carry out the Security Council mandate. The result, in a setting of already low deterrence, was a collapse of the UN mission. One week after the battle of Mogadishu, in a context of wide press attention given in the aftermath of that battle to the body of an American soldier dragged through the streets, the U.S.S. Harlin County, on a UN peacekeeping mission to Haiti, was turned away from the dock in Port-au-Prince by an orchestrated "riot" of fewer than 200. 175 The detrimental consequences for UN operations continued. General Marrack Goulding, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, informed me that following Clinton's decision to stand down U.S. forces in Somalia, UN peacekeepers around the world were greeted with the cry: "Welcome to Mogadishu." It was in that climate that autocratic Hutu leaders in Rwanda concluded that killing a few UN peacekeepers would cause them to go home and give the Hutu extremists a free hand against the Tutsis. They promptly attacked and killed Belgian peacekeepers and were rewarded when Belgium followed Clinton's lead and withdrew their forces. At that point no further consensus could be developed in the Security Council to intervene against the developing genocide in Rwanda. We will never know what would have happened had Clinton stuck with the UN mandate in Somalia and committed U.S. forces to overwhelmingly prevail against Aidid and his apparent Osama bin Laden backers. We do know, however, that the collapse of the UN operation in Somalia and **the subsequent genocide in Rwanda took place in a setting of rapidly** [\*401] **decreasing deterrence** against nondemocratic regimes. 176 Non-war settings, or "the dogs that did not bark," also seem generally consistent with the hypothesis. Thus, neither Canada nor Switzerland seek to militarize their borders with the United States or France, respectively, despite overwhelming military (including nuclear) superiority by their large and contiguous democratic neighbors. Nor do the citizens of the United States fear the French or British nuclear deterrents, despite their ability to devastate the United States - vice versa for the citizens of France and Britain. And NATO, where substantial levels of conventional and nuclear deterrence are present, is a tight alliance that may well have avoided major war wherever its pre-commitments were clear, as was certainly true for any conventional invasion of the core of NATO. Analysis of abrupt changes in the two elements in the war synergy also lends support to the hypothesis. As examples, the ongoing shift in the former Soviet Union from totalitarianism toward democracy produced changes of enormous consequence, many of which would have been unthinkable under the former Soviet regime. These include the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the expansion of NATO to the East, dramatic reductions in military forces, the sale by Russia to the U.S. of fissionable material recycled from Soviet nuclear weapons, and at least a partial removal of the old Soviet automatic veto in the Security Council. Moreover, the spillover effects on arms control from these governmental changes in the former Soviet Union were far greater than the converse spillover from arms control on U.S./Soviet political relations. And, as examples with respect to levels of deterrence, it has already been noted that the internal turmoil following the Iranian revolution produced a rapid decrease in deterrence and ultimately a mistaken attack by Saddam Hussein. Conversely, once coalition forces had been committed to defend Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Shield, deterrence against a full scale Iraqi attack on that country increased [\*402] dramatically. Even in the absence of Desert Storm, the threat had likely passed for Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the partly internal, partly international wars in the ongoing breakup of the former Yugoslavia seem to be a product, at least partly, of a variety of factors reducing deterrence that was formerly present under Tito's iron rule. It might also be noted that the **absence of** direct **great power war since World War II -** the longest such period in five centuries **- coincides with the powerful increase in deterrence** from nuclear forces.